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NOTES
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIRGINIA WILLS ACT
FORMALITIES AND THE NEED FOR A DISPENSING
POWER STATUTE IN VIRGINIA
A farmer suffers an accident while working and his tractor crushes him.
Believing he may die before help arrives, the farmer scratches a will' on
the fender of his tractor. No one is present to act as a witness to the will.
Nor does any opportunity exist for another party to exercise fraud or duress
upon the farmer. If the farmer in fact dies as a result of the accident, may
a court admit to probate the words that he scratched on the tractor fender
2
and that he intended to be his will?
Unless admissible as a holograph, 3 a will that the testator 4 writes and
signs in the testator's own handwriting s the farmer's writing would be

1. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 33.1 (1992) [hereinafter
(defining will as donative transfer that donor does not intend to be legally operative
to effect transfer of property until donor's death); 1 BowE-P.Axum: PAOE ON WLS §§ 5.1-.19
(William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds., 1960) (describing basic nature and elements of wills);
EuzEm HAPNER, 1 VmGN PROBATE LAw ch. 3, at 1 (stating that Virginia cases define wills
as legally executed written instruments that dispose of estate and take effect after testator's death);
1 T. W. HARRISN, HARRISON ON WLS AND ADmuiSTRA.TION § 136 (George P. Smith, Jr. ed.,
1985) (stating that Virginia case law defines wills as acts by which people make disposition of
their property to take effect after they die); AISON REPPY & LsuE J. TowioNs, HISTORIcAL
AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF =E LAW OF Wnus 1 (1928) (defining will as ambulatory and
revocable document that makes disposition of property to take effect after testator's death). Wills
by definition extend to property that the testator acquires after making the will, and testators may
alter wills at any time until death. HiAstE, supra, ch. 3, at 1.
2. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report
on Australia'sTranquilRevolution in ProbateLaw, 87 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 10 n.32 (1987) (referring
to actual Canadian case in which farmer, trapped beneath tractor, scratched will on tractor fender);
W. M. Elliott, Case and Comment, 26 CAN. B. REv. 1242, 1242 (1948) (describing but not citing
actual Canadian case with these facts: Estate of Harris).
3. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 10 n.32 (explaining that Canadian court probated will
as holograph).
4. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1475 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "testator" as person who
makes or has made will or person who dies leaving will); JoHN RICHIE Er AL., DECEDENTS' ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 7 (7th ed. 1988) (stating that in older usage, female who made will was called
"testatrix" rather than "testator"). For purposes of simplicity, in this Note I will use the term
"testator" to refer to both male and female makers of wills.
5. See 2 BowE-PAPR: PAGE ON WILis, supra note 1, §§ 20.1-.12 (describing holographs);
REPPY & TOmKiNs, supra note 1, at 24 (stating that holographic wills are wills that testator has
handwritten); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Form and Formalism:A Case Study, 31 AM. J. Comp.
L. 627, 642 (1983) (stating that few states require that testators sign holographs at end or date
holographs, and noting trend toward permitting more nonhandwritten material on face of holographs); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH.
U. L.Q. 39, 50 (1985) (stating that holographic wills do not require attestation by witnesses); John
REsTATEmwT]
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invalid under the wills act of every American state 6 because of a formal
defect7-the lack of witnesses.' Refusal to admit the writing to probate
would cause the decedent's property not otherwise disposed of to pass under
the intestacy law of the governing jurisdiction 9 and could frustrate the
testator's expressed intent. 10 Some legal scholars have argued that courts
should excuse harmless deviations from wills act formalities" or that state
legislatures should reform the wills acts 2 in order to avoid the harsh results

B. Rees, Jr., American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 634 (1960) (stating that holographs
are entirely in handwriting of testator and, in states that permit holographs, are valid without
attestation by witnesses); Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluationof Holographic
Will Statutes, 17 HoFsra L. REv. 159, 162 (1988) (listing requirements for execution of holographs
in all states that admit holographs to probate). The requirements for the execution of holographs
in various states include the following: the will must be entirely in the handwriting of the testator
and contain the testator's signature, the will must be dated, the will must be among the testator's
valuable papers and effects at the time of the testator's death, and someone (or more than one
person) must be able to identify the testator's handwriting for the probate court. See Natale,
supra,at 162. In this Note I will use the terms "holograph" and "holographic will" interchangeably.
6. See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (describing American wills acts).
7. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. R-v.
489, 489 (1975) (stating that once courts find formal defect in will execution, will is invalid).
8. See RE TA' MENT, supra note 1, at stat. note (listing formal requirements of all state
wills acts); 2 Bowa-PARKER: PAGE ON Wxu.s, supra note 1, §§ 19.73-.142 (discussing attestation
requirements in wills acts); Langbein, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that attestation by witnesses is
essential requirement of ordinary wills); Langbein, supra note 7, at 490 (stating that most states
require two witnesses to attest and sign wills).
9. See 1 HARISON, supra note 1, at § 66 (noting that if testator does not mention certain
property in a will, or if testator attempts to devise property by invalid will or invalid clause in
will, that property passes by intestate succession); Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes
About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978
AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 319, 322 (stating that intestate law governs property, not covered by valid
will); Langbein, supra note 7, at 499 (explaining that when will is invalid, i property of testator
passes by intestate succession). Of course, if the testator had executed another will which was
valid, the testator's property would pass under the valid will rather than by intestacy. See Langbein,
supra note 7, at 499 (noting that when will is invalid, testator's property will
pass under prior
valid will, if one exists). For further discussion of intestate distribution, see infra note 283
(explaining that intestacy statutes often do not reflect dispositive preferences i of testators).
10. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that courts frustrate testator's intent when
they invalidate purported will due to formal defect but concede that testator intended document
to be his will); John H. Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65
A.B.A. J. 1192, 1193 (1979) (stating that noncomplying instruments cause frustrated estate plans).
For further discussion of whether formalities protect or undermine the intent of testators, see infra
notes 280-317 and accompanying text (arguing that formalities do more to undermine than to
protect intent of testators).
11. See R=sTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 33.1 cmt. g (stating that law reform organizations,
commentators, and legislatures in several common-law jurisdictions support use of harmless error
rule to excuse innocent deviations from statutory formalities). The Restatement position is that
courts should treat documents as valid wills despite formal defects if the testator substantially
complied with the formalities and intended the document to be her will. Id; see also Langbein,
supra note 7 (arguing throughout that courts should apply harmless error rule to excuse formal
defects in execution of wills).
12. See, e.g.,
J. Rodney Johnson, Dispensing with Wills Act Formalitiesfor Substantively
Valid Wills, VA. B. As'N J., Winter 1992, at 10, 13 (recommending that Virginia legislature pass
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that flow from a failure to comply with statutory formalities of execution."
The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.),
responding to this scholarship urging wills act reform, proposed revisions
to the U.P.C. that were approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws in 1990.14 The 1990 revisions consolidated all the formal requirements
for will execution in section 2-50215 of the U.P.C. and created a new section6
2-503 that excuses noncompliance with these formalities in some cases.'
Section 2-503 states that when a decedent did not execute a document or a
writing added upon a document in compliance with section 2-502, courts
nevertheless should treat the document or writing as if the decedent had
executed it in compliance with section 2-502 if the proponent of the
document or writing can prove that it is a genuine expression of testamentary
intent. 7 The proponent of a defective writing must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to
constitute the decedent's will, a revocation of the decedent's will, an addition

statute to permit courts to excuse defects in will execution); Langbein, supra note 2 (discussing
throughout need for legislatures to adopt harmless error rule in context of wills acts); Langbein,
supra note 10, at 1195 (explaining wisdom of harmless error rule in effect in South Australia);
Melissa Webb, Note, Wich v. Fleming: The Dilemma of a HarmlessDefect in a Will, 35 BAYLOR
L. REV." 904, 917-19 (1983) (suggesting that Texas legislature should enact either harmless error
rule to excuse formal defects, or saving clause to excuse defective attestation in cases of selfproved wills).
13. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (explaining that invalidating genuine
expressions of testamentary intent frustrates intent of testators).
14. See UNrFORM PROBATE CODE (U.P.C.) § 2-503 cmt. (1990) (discussing with favor Professor
Langbein's articles advocating harmless error doctrine, and noting findings of foreign law reform
committees supporting harmless error doctrine). The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
previously responded to arguments for wills act reform in 1969 by reducing the number of
formalities required in the execution provision of the U.P.C. See U.P.C. § 2-502 (1969) (setting
out reduced number of formalities); Langbein, supra note 2, at 5-6 (discussing 1969 U.P.C. reform
and criticizing mere reduction of formalities as reform method).
15. U.P.C. § 2-502 (1990): This provision requires that a will be in writing, that the testator
sign the will or that another person sign the will on the testator's behalf in the testator's presence
and by his direction, and that at least two witnesses sign the will within a reasonable time after
they observe the testator sign or acknowledge the will. Id. The provision also states that a will is
a valid holographic will if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's
handwriting. Id.
16. See id. § 2-503 (stating that courts should treat defective instrument as valid if testator
intended instrument to be testamentary document). This section reads in full:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in
compliance with Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been
executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document
or writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will, (ii) a partial or complete revocation of
the will, (iii) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (iv) a partial or complete
revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the
will.
17. Id.
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to or alteration of the will, or a revival of the decedent's formerly revoked
will.18
A state legislature enacting a provision like section 2-503 would be

granting broad authority to the state courts 19 to admit to probate documents
that technically are defective as wills. 20 Although the formalities of execution
required by the wills act would not change, 2' the courts would be free to
excuse noncompliance with those formalities if the proponent of a document

could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended the
document to be the testator's will. 22 Statutes like section 2-503 are called

dispensing power statutes because the statutes empower courts to dispense
with the wills act formalities in order to give effect to a testator's proven
a
2

intent.
24
Although no state yet has adopted legislation based on section 2-503,
the 1992 Legislative Committee on Wills, Trusts, and Estates of the Virginia

Bar Association (V.B.A.) favored the adoption of a dispensing power statute
by the Virginia General Assembly. 25 In the General Assembly's 1993 session,

18. Id.
19. See infra notes 365-80 and accompanying text (explaining ramifications of giving probate
courts broad discretion).
20. See infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text (discussing dispensing power provisions).
21. See U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 5, general cmt. (stating that drafters of 1990 U.P.C. retained
formalities of execution that pre-1990 U.P.C. required); Langbein, supra note 2, at 23 (stating
that South Australia dispensing power statute did not change statutory requirements for will
execution, but instead excused noncompliance with these requirements in some cases); C. Douglas
Miller, Will Formality, JudicialFormalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New
Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism: Part II,
43 FiA. L. REv. 599, 717 (1991) (stating that 1990 U.P.C. retains existing standard for due
execution and then invites courts to disregard that standard).
22. See U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (excusing noncompliance with formalities of execution when
proponent of defective document proves decedent intended document as testamentary instrument).
But cf. Miller, supra note 21, at 693-704 (arguing that scope of U.P.C. § 2-503 is unclear and
that § 2-503 may require courts to examine more than simply genuineness of purported will when
deciding whether to excuse formal defects). For a discussion of dispensing power in general and
§ 2-503, see infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text.
23. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 13 (explaining that dispensing power theory set out in
U.P.C. allows courts to validate documents intended to be wills even if required formalities are
entirely absent).
24. See REsrATEmENT, supra note 1, at stat. note (listing wills act statutes for all 50 states);
James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REv. 541, 568
(1990) (stating that no American state yet has adopted dispensing power or substantial compliance
legislation, which would allow courts to excuse defects in execution). For a discussion of the
substantial compliance doctrine and dispensing power provisions, see infra notes 120-66 and
accompanying text.
25. Telephone interview with J. Rodney Johnson, Professor of Law at T.C. Williams School
of Law and member of Virginia Bar Association (V.B.A.) Legislative Committee on Wills, Trusts,
and Estates (Feb. 11, 1993). The Executive Committee of the V.B.A. makes the final decision as
to which of the proposed laws the V.B.A. will advocate each year. Id. While the Legislative
Committee on Wills, Trusts, and Estates recommended that the V.B.A. should sponsor a bill in
1993 adding a dispensing power provision to the Virginia wills act, the V.B.A. Council of the
Wills, Trusts, and Estates Section decided not to further the Legislative Committee's recommen-
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Delegate Clinton Miller introduced a bill modeled closely on the language
of U.P.C. section 2-503. 26 Because the bill never reached a vote in the
House of Delegates, 27 Virginia still does not have a dispensing power
statute.2
This Note first will examine the various statutory and common-law
approaches to the execution of wills and place current Virginia law in this
legal context. 29 Next, this Note will discuss some of the key scholarly
arguments supporting and criticizing the dispensing power concept and
section 2-503, especially as these arguments relate to Virginia's legal system.30
Finally, this Note will argue and conclude that Virginia should enact a
3
dispensing power provision. '

dation to the Executive Committee of the V.B.A. Id. The Council did not forward the recommendation because the Council determined that the V.B.A. already was sponsoring as many laws
in the area of trusts and estates as the V.B.A. could advocate adequately in 1993. Telephone
interview with Linda F. Rigsby, former chairperson of the Wills, Trusts, and Estates Section of
the V.B.A. (Feb. 19, 1993).
26. See H.D. 2160, Va. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993) (setting out proposed dispensing power
statute for consideration of General Assembly). Delegate Clinton Miller offered bill number 2160
on January 26, 1993. Id. The proposed bill reads in full:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That the Code of Virginia is amended by adding a section numbered 64.1-49.1 as
follows:
§ 64.1-49.1. Writings intended as wills, etc.-Although a document or writing
added upon a document was not executed in compliance with § 64.1-49, the document
or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will, (ii)
a partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii) an addition to or an alteration of the
will, or (iv) a partial or complete revival of his formerly revoked will or of a formerly
revoked portion of the will.
The remedy granted by this section is available only in inter partes proceedings in
circuit court, brought under the appropriate provisions of this title, that are filed within
two years from the decedent's date of death.
The provisions of this section shall apply to all documents and writings of decedents
dying after June 30, 1993, regardless of when such documents or writings came into
existence.
Id.
27. Telephone interview with J. Rodney Johnson, supra note 25. The bill never reached a
vote in the House of Delegates because the Committee for the Courts of Justice did not report
out the bill by the deadline for such action. Id.
28. See infra notes 222-51 and accompanying text (discussing how strictly Virginia courts
require testators to adhere to formalities of execution).
29. See infra notes 32-279 and accompanying text (surveying current law of wills execution
and discussing relevant Virginia statutes, cases, and rules of probate procedure).
30. See infra notes 280-380 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly responses to dispensing power concept).
31. See infra notes 381-402 and accompanying text (recommending that Virginia adopt
dispensing power statute). This Note will focus on dispensing power provisions and will discuss
the substantial compliance doctrine for purposes of comparison. This Note will not discuss the
many other possible methods for reforming the law concerning formalities of execution. Reform
methods beyond the scope of this Note include the following: reducing the number of required
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I.
A.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT

The Statutory Requirements for Execution

Every state has a wills act: a statute or statutes 1authorizing and
regulating the making of wills. 32 According to the case law of most states,
individuals have the power to make wills only because the legislature has
granted them that power.33 Therefore, states are free to limit probate 4 to
those instruments complying with certain formalities.35
Each wills act lists some required formalities of execution,3 6 which vary
from state to state. 37 Commonly required formalities include a writing (rather

formalities in the wills acts, see, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 24 (arguing throughout that legislatures
should eliminate attestation requirements for execution of wills); requiring testators to register
wills, see Lydia A. Clougherty, Note, An Analysis of the National Advisory Committee On
Uniform State Laws' Recommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283,
298 (1991) (suggesting creation of registry of wills); completely unifying the law of probate and
nonprobate transfers, see Miller, supra note 21, at 720 (proposing total unification of law of

donative transfers); and using antemortem probate, see Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills
Act?, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 521 (1948) (noting need for further study of antemortem probate).
32. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at stat. note (citing wills acts of all states); 2 BowE-

PARK.ER: PAGE ON Wis, supra note 1, § 19.4 (stating that every state has statute governing
execution of wills).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 629 (1896) (stating that states may
regulate manner in which property may pass by will); Fullam v. Brock, 155 S.E.2d 737, 739 (N.C.
1967) (stating that statutes confer and regulate right to make wills); In re Miller's Estate, 117
N.E.2d 598, 604 (Ohio 1954) (stating that statutes grant and limit right to dispose of property by
will); 2 BowE-PAcaER: PAcE ON WIus, supra note 1, § 19.4 (noting that legislatures have power
to regulate making of wills and validity of wills); RPPY & TompKims, supra note 1, at 47-48
(noting that right to testamentary disposition is statutory right but always has existed in United
States); Verner F. Chaffin, Execution, Revocation, and Revalidation of Wills : A Critique of
Existing Statutory Formalities, 11 GA. L. Ray. 297, 298 (1977) (stating that states create right to
execute, revoke, and revalidate wills); Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 333 (stating that U.S.
Constitution does not protect right of succession and noting that Wisconsin! disagrees). But see In
re Estate of Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1962) (holding that power of legislature to
circumscribe will-making power is limited and power of individuals to make wills is natural right);
Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N.W. 627, 628-30 (Wis. 1906) (same).
34. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990) (defining probate). Probate is the

civil procedure by which courts determine whether a will is valid or invalid; in current usage this
term has been expanded to refer generally to the legal process wherein the estate of a decedent is
administered. Id. For purposes of this Note, "probate" will denote the process by which courts
declare wills valid or invalid.
35. See supra note 33 (describing power of state legislatures to regulate execution of wills).
36. See RSTATEmENT, supra note 1, at stat. note (listing requirements of execution for every
state); Charles L Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalitiesand Formalism:A CriticalLook at the
Execution of Wills, 6 Pa'P,. L. Rnv. 331, 345-47 (1979) (providing brief survey of formalities that
various states require). For an excellent older survey of the requirements of execution in state wills
acts, see Rees, supra note 5, at 614-34.
37. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that required formalities vary by jurisdiction).
One basic cause of the variation among states as to what formalities the states require is that the
state wills acts did not all come from the same source. Many states based their wills acts on the
English Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. II, ch. 3, § 5 (Eng.); other states modeled their wills
acts on the English Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 9 (Eng.); and the Louisiana
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than an oral statement), the testator's signature, publication," and attestation by witnesses. 39 Some states recognize holographs 4° or nuncupative (oral)
42
wills 41 and set out different execution requirements for these will types.

wills act reflects Louisiana's civil law heritage. See 2 BowE-PARKER: PAGE ON WiLLs, supra note
1, § 19.2 (stating that Statute of Frauds and Wills Act of 1837 are basic sources of American
wills acts and noting that only Louisiana wills act significantly adds to requirements of these
English statutes); Ricnm Er AL., supra note 4, at 192 (stating that Louisiana has wills based on
civil law as well as ordinary attested wills); Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution CeremonyHistory, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. Tax. L. REV. 413, 418-19 (1987) (discussing Statute of
Frauds and Wills Act of 1837 as bases for much law of wills in United States); Chaffin, supra
note 33, at 299-300 (stating that wills acts of all states except Louisiana are based on English
Statute of Frauds or Wills Act of 1837); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 547-48, 550 (noting that
Statute of Frauds and Wills Act of 1837 are two principle sources of American wills acts, and
comparing formalities required by Statute of Frauds and Wills Act in chart form); Natale, supra
note 5, at 159 n.6 (explaining that attestation requirements in statutes based on English Statute
of Frauds tend to differ from requirements in statutes based on English Wills Act of 1837).
38. See BlAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "publication" as formal
declaration or other communication made by testator to witnesses that testator intends to give
document effect as testator's will).
39. See REsTATEmmNT, supra note 1, at stat. note (listing requirements in all states); 2 BowaPARKaR: PAGE ON Wuis, supra note 1, § 19.4 (stating that chief formalities required by American
wills acts are writing, testator's signature, attestation and subscription by competent witnesses, and
publication).
40. See supra note 5 (defining holographs and requirements for execution of holographs).
41. See 2 Bowa-PARKER: PAGE ON WILTs, supra note 1, §§ 20.13-.30 (discussing nuncupative
wills); Chaffin, supra note 33, at 326-30 (discussing characteristics, purposes, and disadvantages
of oral wills); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers,
51 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1941) (stating that nuncupative wills are limited and rare).
42. See Rees, supra note 5, at 636-46 (explaining that some states do not recognize
nuncupative wills as valid wills, other states allow only soldiers and sailors to make nuncupative
wills, and some states have adopted limitations on nuncupative wills set out in English Statute of
Frauds of 1677). See generally Natale, supra note 5 (describing and evaluating holographic will
statutes in United States).
The following statutes allow holographic wills: A.AsKA STAT. § 13.11.160 (1985); AmuZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6111 (West 1991); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-11-503 (1987); IDA-o CODE § 15-2-503 (1979); Ky.
Ray. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1588-89 (West
1987) and LA. CODE Crv. PRoC. ANN. art. 2883 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-503 (West 1981); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRusTs § 4-103 (1974); MiCH. COmp. LAws
ANN. § 700.123 (West 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-5-1, 91-7-10 (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-303 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328 (1989); NEv. RE. STAT. § 133.090 (1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 1983); N.Y. EST. PowRs & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.2 (McKinney
1981); N.C. GEaN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (1984); N.D. CENr. CODE § 30.1-08-03 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit.
84, § 54 (1981); S.D. CoDIIED LAws ANN. § 29-2-8 (1984); TeNN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-105 (1984);
TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 60, 84 (West 1980); UTA- CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (1978); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-49 (Michie 1987); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-113 (1980). In
addition, case law in Alabama and Washington indicates that these two states sometimes will
recognize holographic wills of nonresidents. See Black v. Seals, 474 So. 2d 696, 697-98 (Ala. 1985)
(allowing for holographic wills of nonresidents); In re Wegley's Estate, 399 P.2d 326, 327 (Wash.
1965) (holding that holographic will valid in testator's domicile is valid in Washington).
The following statutes allow nuncupative wills of some kind: ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.158
(1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-107 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-2-47 to 53-2-50 (Michie 1982);
IND. CODE § 29-1-5-4 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-608, 59-619 (1983); LA. Crv. CODE
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Currently, no state wills act expressly permits any deviation from the
43
formalities of execution.
A statute setting out formalities of execution typically applies to more
than just the creation of wills. 44 Most states require that when a testator
revokes a will or revives a previously revoked will in writing, the testator
must execute the writing with the same formalities that state law requires
for the execution of wills. 45 Testators also must execute codicils4 and
alterations to wills with full statutory formality in order for the codicils
and alterations to be valid.47 In sum, the wills acts require that testators
execute with full formality almost any writing that directly affects the
substance or validity of a will. 41
Statutes requiring formalities of execution have several purposes. 49 The
required formalities, especially the requirement of attestation by witnesses,
art. 1578 (West 1987); MAss. GN. LAws ANN. ch. 191, § 6 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 91-5-15, 91-5-21 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.340 (Vernon 1956); NEv. REv. STAT. § 133.100
(1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 551:15, 551:16 (1974); N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRusTs LAw § 32.2 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GE. STAT. §31-3.5 (1984); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.60 (Baldwin
1987); OK.A. STAT. tit. 84, § 46 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-6 (1984): !S.D. COD=E LAws
ANN. § 29-2-9 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-106 (1984); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 64, 65
(West 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-53 (Michie 1987); WASH.
RE. CODE ANN. § 11.12.025 (West 1987) ; W. VA. CODE § 41-1-5 (1982).
ANN.

43. See supra note 24 (noting that no state has adopted dispensing power or substantial
compliance approach as part of wills act).
44. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing how formalities of execution
apply to written revocations and revivals of wills, alterations of wills, and codicils).
45. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 299 (noting that testator must follow formalities that
wills act requires for execution of will in order to revoke will in writing); Johnson, supra note
12, at 13 (stating that Virginia law provides for revocation of wills by writing which testator
executes in accordance with formalities for execution of wills); John B. Rees, American Wils
Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. Rav. 856, 873-74, 890 (1960) (explaining that states tend to require same
formalities for revoking and reviving wills in writing as for making wills).
46. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "codicil"). A codicil is a
supplement or addition to a will which may modify, explain, add to, subtract from, qualify, alter,
restrain or revoke provisions in an existing will. Id.
47. See 2 BowE-PARKER: PAGE ON Wius, supra note 1, § 19.4 (stating that required
formalities for execution of wills apply equally to execution of codicils unless statute specifies
otherwise); HAPNER, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 4 (stating that alterations made to will before its
execution are part of will); Miller, supra note 21, at 674 (stating that state wills acts generally
require testators to execute additions to and alterations of wills with wills act formality).
48. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (explaining that formalities of execution
often apply to execution of codicils, alterations to wills, and writings that revoke wills). Although
I do not propose to discuss them in this Note, a few exceptions exist to the general rule that
testators must execute all documents that affect the substance of a will with full formality.
Contracts to make wills, writings incorporated into wills through the doctrinIe of incorporation by
reference, and pourover trusts are all writings that may lack formal execution but have an effect
on the meaning or effect of will provisions. See 2 Bow-PARKaR: PAGE ON WILIs, supra note 1,
§§ 19.17-.33 (discussing doctrine of incorporation by reference); I HARRISON, supra note 1, §§ 94,
140(6) (stating that courts may enforce in equity contracts to make wills and that testators may
incorporate nontestamentary writings into wills by reference); Rees, supra note 5, at 650-51
(describing requirements for incorporation by reference and pourover trusts).
49. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 5-15 (discussing purposes of formalities for will
execution).
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protect the testator from mistake, fraud, and undue influence.50 The formalities also serve a cautionary or "ritual" function because the execution
ceremony impresses upon testators the seriousness and importance of making
a testamentary disposition. 5' Formalities provide courts with reliable evidence

that the purported will is genuine. 2 The signature and attestation requirements and the handwriting requirement in the case of a holograph 53 are
54
especially important formalities from an evidentiary standpoint.

Formalities also serve a "channeling" function. 55 The statute describing
proper execution for wills provides a legal framework upon which testators
can model their actions. 6 The existence of this framework tends to make
testamentary documents more uniform, which eases the administrative burden on the probate courts. 5 7 The existence of statutory guidelines also allows
testators who comply with the wills acts to have some assurance that their
58
documents will be valid.
The wills act formalities were important historically to provide evidence
of land conveyances 59 and to serve certain sociological functions. 60 These

50. See Langbein, supranote 7, at 496-97 (noting that attestation requirements serve protective
function and noting decreased importance of protective function today); Howard M. McCue III
& Melinda M. Kleehanier, When Almost is Good Enough: South Australia Excuses Technical
Failure to Comply with Wills Act Formalities-Couldit Happen Here?, TR. & Esr., May 1989,
at 47, 47 (stating that formalities of execution generally serve purpose of protecting testators,
courts, and intended beneficiaries of estates against fraud); Clougherty, supra note 31, at 285
(stating that formalities protect testators from mistakes); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 913 (discussing protective function of formalities).
51. See Gulliver & Tison, supra note 41, at 5-6 (calling cautionary function of formalities
"ritual function"); Langbein, supra note 7, at 494-95 (discussing cautionary function of formalities);
Clougherty, supra note 31, at 284 (explaining that formalities promote clear planning by testators
in face of psychological pressures). Because making a will is often a traumatic event, testators
may need the formalities to help them avoid distractions and plan wisely. See Beyer, supra note
37, at 419-20 (discussing psychological vulnerability of testators); Thomas L. Shaffer, The 'Estate
Planning" Counselorand Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IowA L. REv. 376, 377 (1969) (stating
that estate planning is traumatic to testators); Thomas L. Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young Family
Clients and the Psychology of Testation, 44 Nonmt DAms LAw. 345, 347, 355-62 (1969) (stating
that clients are confronted with idea of personal mortality during will preparation interviews and
that clients may deny personal mortality or evade subject of death).
52. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 6-9 (discussing evidentiary function of formalities).
53. See supra note 5 (discussing requirements for execution of holographs).
54. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 493 (stating that signature, attestation, and handwriting
requirements serve evidentiary function).
55. See id. at 493-94 (discussing "channeling" function).
56. See id. at 494 (stating that wills act provides model for testators).
57. See id. (stating that formalities promote uniformity in content and form of wills and
ease administration of wills).
58. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAv. L.
REv. 1685, 1698 (1976) (explaining that formalities increase predictability in judicial processes by
reducing judicial discretion); Langbein, supra note 7, at 494 (stating that testators who model wills
on wills act normally are assured of wills' validity); Clougherty, supra note 31, at 285 (arguing
that formalities increase predictability of probate process and restrain judicial arbitrariness).
59. Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 336-37 (explaining that writing requirement for wills
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historical purposes for the formalities have little importance today. 61 One

scholar has argued that the wills act formalities also serve to limit the
discretion of probate
courts, 62 which states traditionally have treated as
63
inferior tribunals.
B. Construing the Statutory Formalities
The statutory language is only the tip of a legal iceberg, for courts have
created a large body of common law interpreting and applying the statutory
requirements for will execution. 64 Courts grapple with the many terms
contained in the wills acts, such as "witness" 65 and "subscribe," ' that
become ambiguous in light of the peculiar facts of specific cases. 67 When
courts construe the requirements of the wills acts, the courts are deciding
exactly what testators must do to execute wills properly.
entered English law because legislators intended writing to serve as evidence of conveyances). The
original Statute of Wills in England, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch.1, permitted testators to devise land in
writing. Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 334-35. Testators at that time were free to dispose of
personal property by oral wills. Id. at 336. The reason for this distinction in the requirements for
disposing of real and personal property was that legislators intended the writing to serve as
evidence of land transfers, as do modern recording systems for deeds. Id. at 336-37; see Lindgren,
supra note 24, at 551 (explaining that states today have effective systems for recording deeds).
60. See Fassberg, supra note 5, at 628-30 (stating that formalism historically has had great
social significance). Fassberg argues that formalism was important in ancient societies because the
central feature of ancient societies was "the group." Id. at 629. Rigid legal forms embodied the
certainty that society and group membership provided to individuals. Id. at 630.
61. See id. at 637-38 (stating that formalism is neither necessary nor helpful in modem
society); Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 337 (noting that recording statutes, not modem wills
acts, provide evidence of conveyances today).
62. See Mann, supra note 5, at 63-68 (explaining that wills act formalities limit discretion
of probate courts and promote control over probate courts by appellate courts).
63. See id. at 62 (stating that probate courts in most states traditionally had limited
jurisdiction and inferior status); Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, The Organization of the
Probate Court in America: I, 42 MICH. L. Rv. 965, 982, 988-92 (1944) (explaining that probate
courts in America customarily have had lower status than other trial level courts, and noting that
rules of probate procedure indicate that people making rules did not trust probate court judgments).
64. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 489 (stating that courts reach different conclusions on
issue of what acts constitute compliance with what formalities).
65. See In re Estate of McGurrin, 743 P.2d 994, 997-99 (Idaho Ct. App.) (discussing meaning
of term "witnessed" in Idaho wills act), appeal denied, 746 P.2d 85 (Idaho 1987). In McGurrin,
the testator signed the contested will in a hospital room. Id. at 995. The testator's secretary took
the will home and had her mother and sister sign it. Id. The secretary then returned the will to
the testator in the hospital. Id. The testator called the mother and sister on the telephone and
thanked them for witnessing the will. Id. When the executor offered this will for probate, a friend
of the testator challenged the will on the grounds that the witnesses had not attested the will
properly under state law. Id. at 996. While the challenger argued that witnesses must observe the
testator sign or acknowledge the will, the proponents argued that witnesses do not have to be in
the presence of the testator to witness a will. Id. at 997. The court held that in order to validly
witness a will, the witnesses must observe the testator sign or acknowledge the will. Id. at 999.
66. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (describing case in which court construed
meaning of term "subscribe" in wills act).
67. See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts had to
determine meaning of signing and witnessing requirements in wills act).
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Courts vary greatly in their methods of interpreting the wills acts. Some
courts insist that the words of the wills act mean no more than their plain
meanings or dictionary definitions. 6 Other courts are willing to give the
terms in the wills act a broader or different interpretation than the terms'
plain meanings. 69 Depending on the facts of individual cases, any constructional approach may rescue a will from technical challenges. 70 As long as
the execution of a purported will satisfies the wills act requirements as
interpreted by the court examining the will, that will is not formally
defective. Unfortunately, courts sometimes construe the required formalities
in such a way as to make genuine expressions of testamentary intent
technically deficient and therefore vulnerable to challenges on the grounds
71
of errors in execution.
Gardner v. BalbonP2 is an example of a case in which the court's
construction of a wills act requirement defused a formal challenge to a
purported will that expressed the genuine intent of the testator. The Gardner
case involved a will contest in which the plaintiffs contended that the
testator had not "subscribed" the will as state law required. 7 The plaintiffs
argued that the term "subscribe" in the Connecticut wills act meant to sign
74
at the end of the will and that the end of the will was the execution clause.
The testator in Gardner had not signed the will immediately beneath the
execution clause but instead had signed under a self-proving affidavit that
75
followed the attestation clause.
The Gardner court held that the will was valid. 76 In interpreting the
subscription requirement, the Gardner court looked at the plain meaning
of the statutory language. Quoting 'Black's Law Dictionary, the Gardner
court stated that "subscribe" literally means to write underneath, not to
write at the end. 77 Despite the intervening affidavit, the testator's signature
78
was underneath all the will provisions.

68. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing case in which court focused on
plain meaning of language in construing wills act).
69. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 307-08 (stating that some Georgia courts have interpreted
acknowledgment requirements of Georgia wills act expansively); J.G. Miller, Substantial Compliance
and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 559, 559-60 (1987) (stating that some courts
are "generous" in construing wills act).
70. See Miller, supra note 69, at 560 (noting that desire to uphold wills may prompt courts
to look beyond plain meaning of language of wills act in some cases); see infra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text (discussing case in which "plain meaning" interpretation of term in wills act
led to conclusion that testator had executed will properly).
71. See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing case in which court's construction
of wills act led to conclusion that will was formally deficient).
72. 588 A.2d 634 (Conn. 1991).
73. Gardner y. Balboni, 588 A.2d 634, 638 (Conn. 1991).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The Gardner court adopted this construction of the statutory language
in order to validate the will. The Gardner court noted that the challengers
did not contest the authenticity of the testator's signature, 79 but rather
challenged the will solely on the grounds of a formal deficiency. After
explaining the proper definition of "subscribe," the court stated that
rejecting the testator's signature as a valid subscription of the will would
improperly elevate form over substance because the signature was authentic. s0
Unlike the Gardner court, many courts have interpreted the wills acts
in such a way that the execution of a document expressing testamentary
intent falls short of the statutory requirements. 8' For example, in Estate of
Royal,12 the Supreme Court of Colorado dealt with a will containing no
signatures which was offered for probate by the testator's daughter. 3 When
the testator's sons challenged the will, two of the decedent's neighbors filed
affidavits stating that they had been present at the execution of the will
and now would be willing to sign the document as witnesses.The Royal court stated that the dispositive issue was whether the state's
wills act permitted witnesses to sign a will after the testator's death.85 The
statute required that witnesses sign a will, but was silent as to when the
witnesses should sign.16 The court looked beyond the words of the statute
and considered the legislative intent underlying the wills act formalities."
Because the Royal court believed that the legislature intended the execution
requirements to reduce fraud in the making of wills,88 the court imposed a
time requirement for signing in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the
statute as a device to prevent fraud.8 9 The court stated that the statute's
requirement of attestation by witnesses necessarily included a requirement
that the witnesses sign the will before the testator's death 0°
The Royal court's interpretation of the wills act in effect created an
additional formality of execution, a requirement that witnesses must sign a

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. See, e.g., Succession of Babin, 215 So. 2d 649, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that
trial judge's interpretation of requirement concerning attestation clause was too literal); Bell v.
Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 1950) (stating that term "wholly" in wills act does not mean
100%).
82. 826 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1992).
83. Estate of Royal, 826 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Colo. 1992).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1236.

86. Id. at 1237.
87. Id. at 1239.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 1237, 1239. Compare the Royal holding with the holdings in In re Estate of
Flicker, 339 N.W.2d 914, 915 (Neb. 1983), which required witnesses to sign a will before the
testator's death, and In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1011 (N.J. 1987), which adopted the
rule that witnesses must sign wills within a reasonable time after observing a testator sign or attest
a will but declined to hold that witnesses may never sign a will after the testator's death.

9
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will before the testator's death. 91 Because the execution of the purported
will in this case violated this "new" timing requirement, 92 the will was
technically deficient. 93 The Royal court then had to decide whether this
formal defect was a fatal one. The Royal court did not excuse the defect
in the contested will, but instead held that the purported will was invalid.9 4
C.

Applying the Formalities of Execution

Once a court has interpreted the wills act language, the court then must
decide how to apply the statute to the facts of individual cases. In other

words, the court must determine how strictly testators must adhere to the
wills act requirements, however construed.9 5 A court's approach to applying
the wills act formalities is a completely separate issue from, and may in
fact bear little resemblance to, the court's approach to constructional issues.
Courts that refuse to look beyond the plain meaning of the wills act

language when interpreting the required formalities may be quite flexible
when applying the requirements, and vice versa.96

Courts traditionally have required that testators strictly comply with
formalities in all situations. 97 Scholars have identified a recent trend toward
a more flexible application of the execution requirements, however. 98 Interpreting the relevant case law is difficult because courts do not use precise
or consistent terminology" and because no bright lines divide the various
approaches courts take in applying formalities of execution. 10
91. Estate of Royal, 826 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Colo. 1992) (agreeing with probate court that
Colorado wills act required that witnesses sign will before testator's death).
92. Id. (noting that purported will contained no witnesses' signatures when proponent offered
will for probate after death of testator).
93. Id. at 1240 (affirming judgment below that document was not valid will).
94. Id. Under the rule the court of appeals adopted below, which also required witnesses
to sign before the testator's death but recognized an exception to this requirement, the will was
invalid because the exception did not apply. Id. at 1237. It appears that the will should have been
invalid regardless of the timing issue because no witnesses' signatures, whether made before or
after the death of the testator, appeared on the will when the testator's daughter offered the will
for probate. Id. The state statute expressly requires that witnesses sign wills. Id. However, the
Colorado Supreme Court stated that the timing problem was the legal issue in the case. Id. at
1236.
95. See infra notes 107-63 and accompanying text (discussing several different rules conerming
how strictly testators must comply with formalities of execution).
96. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (describing case in which court considered
legislative intent in construing wills act requirements but applied these requirements rigidly).
97. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 489 (stating that once court finds formal defect in will,
that will is invalid); Mann, supra note 5, at 39 (noting that courts routinely invalidate wills for
minor defects even when courts do not doubt that wills are genuine).
98. See Wnims M. McGovERN, JR. ET AL., WiLas, TRusrs, AND EsTATEs 158-60 (1988)
(describing modem trend toward reducing and relaxing wills act formalities).
99. See Miller, supra note 69, at 565-66 (stating that courts and legislatures can interpret
"substantial compliance" many different ways); Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 355 (noting
that term "substantial compliance," as used in will formalities cases, is ambiguous). For a
discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine, see infra notes 120-47 and accompanying text.
100. See Miller, supra note 21, at 701 (describing U.P.C. approach to application of wills
act requirements as being somewhere on continuum between approach under South Australia law
and approach suggested by another scholar).
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Despite the infinite variations on the theme of compliance with wills
act formalities,' 0' cases concerning the level of required compliance fall into
three basic categories. 0 2 Many courts still require strict compliance with all
formalities. 03 Others insist only that testators substantially comply with the
statutory requirements.' °0 A third approach is the dispensing power approach

suggested by U.P.C. section 2-503 and in effect in some foreign jurisdictions. 05 The dispensing power approach is an even less stringent enforcement
approach than the substantial compliance doctrine.' °
1. Strict Compliance
American courts traditionally have invalidated any will that does not
comply fully with each requirement for execution contained in the wills act,
regardless of whether the defective document is a genuine, expression of the
testator's intent. 0 7 Most jurisdictions still follow the strict compliance rule. 08
Recent strict compliance decisions include decisions !from Florida, 0 9

101. McGovrRuE ALr ., supra note 98, at 158 (stating that trend away from formalism is
difficult to document due to infinite variations in facts of cases).
102. See infra notes 107-66 and accompanying text (describing three basic approaches to
application of wills act requirements).
103. See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (discussing strict: compliance doctrine).
Perhaps the most notorious strict compliance decision is Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729
(rex. 1966) (invalidating purported will containing witnesses' signatures only on attached affidavit).
Scholars have criticized the Boren court's inflexible approach to formalities. See Mann, supra note
5, at 39-40 (calling Boren line of cases odd and perverse); Miller, supra note 21, at 712 (stating
that cases such as Boren are harsh, unfair, and absurd).
104. See infra notes 120-47 and accompanying text (explaining substantial compliance doc-

trine).
105. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing use of dispensing power in
Manitoba, New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia, and Northern Territory of

Australia).
106. See infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text (discussing dispensing power).
107. See Langbeiri, supra note 7, at 489 (explaining that courts typically invalidate purported
wills when courts find formal defect).
108. See Clougherty, supra note 31, at 290 (stating that most American jurisdictions currently
will not validate purported wills that only substantially comply with wills act formalities).
109. In re Estate of Dickson, 590 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
testator must strictly comply with formalities of execution to make will or to revoke will by
subsequent writing). In Dickson, the testator's attorney offered the testator's will for probate, but
the testator's daughter challenged the will on the grounds that the decedent had revoked the will.
Id. The Florida wills act permitted testators to revoke a will by performing certain destructive
physical acts to the will or by expressly revoking the will in a later writing executed with full
formality. Id. at 473. At the bottom of a self-proving affidavit attached to the will, the testator
in Dickson had printed and signed a statement that the will was null and void. Id. at 472. The
testator also had written "void" over the notarial seal on the will. Id. 'Noting that the court
required strict compliance with statutory formalities to make or revoke wills, the Dickson court
held that the testator had not revoked the will by a subsequent writing because the testator did
not execute the writing he put on the will with full formality. Id. at 472-73. However, the court
noted that the marking of the will by the testator could constitute enough of a destructive physical
act to revoke the will. Id. The Dickson court remanded the case with orders that the probate
court should consider evidence on the issue of revocation by physical act. Id. at 474.
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Pennsylvania, 110 Idaho,"' Texas," 2 and Montana."'
One typical example of a strict compliance case is Estate of Royal,
which the Supreme Court of Colorado decided in 1992.14 While the Royal
court looked beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language in construing the requirements of the Colorado wills act,"15 the Royal court was
not flexible in applying the statutory requirements as it had construed them
to the contested will at issue in this case. The Royal court stated that
although the Colorado legislature had reduced the number of will execution
formalities in 1974, the legislature required strict adherence to the remaining
formalities in order to prevent fraud." 6 The Royal court stressed that only
the legislature, not the courts, may alter the rules set forth in the statute." 7

110. In re Estate of Proley, 422 A.2d 136, 138 (Pa. 1980) (holding that rule of strict
compliance is legislative mandate). In Proley, the testator wrote her name on the portion of the
will that served as the cover page when the document was folded properly. Id. at 137-38. The
governing statute in Pennsylvania required the testator to sign the will at the end. State courts in
earlier decisions had interpreted this requirement to mean that the testator must sign at what
objectively appeared to be the logical end of the document. Id. at 138. The court in Proley held
that the testator did not sign at the logical end and the document was not a valid will. Id. The
court recognized that the decision frustrated the testator's apparent intent, but stated that only a
strict application of the statutory requirements would adequately prevent fraud. Id.; see also John
J. Bums, Recent Decision, 20 DuQ. L. Ray. 365 (1982) (discussing Proley decision and related
Pennsylvania cases).
111. In re Estate of McGurrin, 743 P.2d 994, 1002 (Idaho Ct. App.) (refusing to apply
substantial compliance doctrine), appeal denied, 746 P.2d 85 (Idaho 1987). In McGurrin a party
challenged the validity of a will because the testator and the witnesses had communicated concerning
the will only by telephone. Id. at 995. The court decided that the controlling statute required that
witnesses observe the testator sign or acknowledge the will. Id. at 999. After discussing and
rejecting the substantial compliance doctrine, the court refused to validate the will. Id. at 1002.
For a discussion of statutory construction issues in McGurrin, see supra note 65.
112. Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983) (adhering to strict compliance rule);
see generally Webb, supra note 12 (analyzing and criticizing Wich decision and related Texas
cases). In Wich the testator executed her will in the presence of two witnesses. Wich, 652 S.W.2d
at 354. Rather than signing at the end of the body of the will, the witnesses signed at the end of
a self-proving affidavit printed at the bottom of the last page of the will. Id. The Wich court
noted that testimony indicated that the testator and witnesses believed the execution was valid. Id.
Citing an earlier case for the proposition that the attestation of the will was defective, and noting
that only the legislature has the authority to change the requirements of the wills act, the Wich
court upheld a trial court order denying probate. Id. at 355-56.
113. In re Estate of Sample, 572 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Mont. 1977) (invalidating will containing
witnesses' signatures on attached affidavit only). In Sample the proponent of a will appealed from
a lower court decision denying probate. Id. at 1232. The Sample court noted that because the
purported will was not a holograph, state law required that witnesses sign the will. Id. at 1233.
In this case, the witnesses had signed a self-proving affidavit on a separate page attached to the
will, but had not signed anywhere on the body of the will. Id. Declaring that the will and the
affidavit served separate functions, the Sample court decided that the witnesses had not signed
the will itself and therefore held that the will was invalid. Id. at 1234.
114. Estate of Royal, 826 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1992).
115. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing construction issues in Royal
case).
116. Royal, 826 P.2d at 1238.
117. Id.
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Because the witnesses to the contested will had not signed the will before
the testator's death as required by the Colorado wills act,"' the Royal court
refused to admit the will to probate." 9
2.

Substantial Compliance

Unlike the Royal court, some state courts have excused errors in will

execution that the courts deemed to be harmless. 20 Without statutory
authorization to excuse noncompliance, the only way a court can excuse
12

such defects is to rely on the judicial doctrine of substantial compliance.
The substantial compliance doctrine is essentially a functional or purposeful
application of the wills acts.' 2 In other words, the doctrine focuses on the
purposes of the statutory formalities rather than the literal language of the
statute.2 A court applying the substantial compliance doctrine may recognize that a document is formally defective but nevertheless deem the
document to satisfy the wills act because the document substantially complies
with the relevant provisions. 1 4
What constitutes "substantial compliance" with the wills act is a matter
of debate.'2 Professor John H. Langbein has stated that in! order to comply
substantially with the wills act, a will must (1) express the intent of the
testator and (2) sufficiently approximate the prescribed formalities so that
the document satisfies the purposes of the wills act. 26 Most state courts
that purport to apply a substantial compliance rule define substantial
compliance somewhat differently. State courts generally demand not only
that a purported will express the genuine intent of the testator and satisfy
the purposes of the wills act, but also that the2 7execution of the will deviate
only slightly from the statutory requirements.

118. Id. at 1237 (noting that when proponent offered will for probate, will contained no
witnesses' signatures); see supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text (discussing court s interpretation
of attestation requirements in Royal).
119. Royal, 826 P.2d at 1240.
120. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text (discussing substantial compliance case
from New Jersey); see also RSTATEmENT, supra note 1, at reporter's note (summarizing some
American substantial compliance cases).
121. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that only avenue of reform open to court
without legislative intervention is application of substantial compliance doctrine). For further
discussion of this point, see infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing whether courts may
apply dispensing power without legislative authorization).
122. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 499 (explaining that substantial compliance doctrine is
functional approach to wills act).
123. See id. (explaining that if execution is sufficient to serve purposes of wills act, substantial
compliance doctrine permits excusing literal noncompliance with wills act).
124. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that court applying substantial compliance
doctrine recognizes document as defective but deems it in compliance with wills act).
125. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (discussing different interpretations of
what constitutes "substantial compliance" with wills act).
126. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 489 (setting out two-prong substantial compliance test).
127. See Mann, supra note 5, at 45 n.28, 61 (explaining that line of "substantial compliance"
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Professor Langbein describes his interpretation of the substantial compliance doctrine by analogizing it to cases involving statute of frauds
violations.'2 The statute of frauds mandates that certain transactions are
invalid unless in writing. 129 However, courts often enforce contracts that
violate the statute of frauds. 30 Courts may enforce such parol agreements
under the judicially created partial performance and main purpose rules.'
These rules alleviate the results of noncompliance with the statute of frauds
in cases in which the purpose of the statute, fraud prevention, was served
in spite of literal noncompliance with the statute's provisions.1 2 Professor
Langbein urges that courts also should excuse harmless defects in wills.,
A recent New Jersey case, In re Will of Ranney, 3 4 illustrates how the
substantial compliance doctrine works in practice. In Ranney, the New
cases from Kentucky focused on highly technical issues and did not apply Professor Langbein's
formulation of substantial compliance doctrine); Miller, supra note 21, at 714 (referring to courts
that have tacitly applied quantitative substantial compliance approach to validate marginal wills);
C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, JudicialFormalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination
of the New Uniform ProbateCode "HarmlessError"Rule and the Movement TowardAmorphism:
Part I, 43 FiA. L. Rv. 167, 229-30 (1991) (stating that some courts have applied quantitative
principle of substantial compliance by holding that testator's conduct achieved sufficiently high
level of conformity with requirements of execution to be in compliance with those formalities);
W. R. Habeeb, Annotation, Sufficiency of Publication of Will, 60 A.L.R.2D 124, 136-37 (1958)
(listing cases that required only "substantial compliance" with publication requirement). The brief
descriptions of "substantial compliance" cases in this annotation indicate that the courts were not
applying Professor Langbein's broad formulation of the substantial compliance doctrine and would
not permit large deviations from the required formalities of execution. Id. But see Estate of Kajut,
22 Pa. D. & C. 123, 136 (1981) (citing Langbein for proposition that purpose of wills act is to
promote intent of testators, and holding that execution of contested will substantially complied
with requirements because execution fulfilled purposes of wills act formalities); infra notes 134-42
and accompanying text (discussing case in which court appeared to apply substantial compliance
doctrine as described by Professor Langbein).
In Kajut some of a decedent's intestate heirs attacked the testator's purported will on several
grounds, including improper execution. Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C. at 124, 129. The Pennsylvania
wills act required that when a testator signed a will by mark, another person should write the
testator's name at the end of the will in the testator's presence. Id. at 129. Because the testator
in Kajut was blind, he signed by mark. Id. at 130. Another person typed the testator's name at
the end of the will, but did not do this in the testator's presence. Id. at 134. The court found
that the will was a genuine expression of the testator's intent and had not been procured by fraud
or undue influence. Id. at 129. The court determined that because the execution in this case
fulfilled the purposes of the signature requirement-identifying the document and preventing
fraud-the execution was at least in substantial compliance with the wills act. Id. at 130-31.
128. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 498 (discussing judicial treatment of statute of frauds as
functional and nonformalistic).
129. See 2 ARTHm L. CoaN, Coaann oN CoNTRAcTs § 275 (1950) (explalning that statute
of frauds makes some oral contracts unenforceable).
130. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 498 (stating that courts validate some contracts that
violate statute of frauds).
131. See id. (stating that courts enforce parol agreements under part performance and main
purpose rules).
132. See id. at 499 (explaining that courts excuse noncompliance with statute of frauds if
purposes of statute are served).
133. See id. at 489 (recommending substantial compliance doctrine to American courts).
134. 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
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Jersey Supreme Court considered the validity of a purported will that

contained no witnesses' signatures but that was attached to a properly
witnessed, self-proving affidavit.'35 The controlling New Jersey statute required that all wills contain two witnesses' signatures. 136 The New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's decision that because the signed
affidavit was part of the will, the will had no formal defects. 3 7 The Ranney
court recognized that the will was formally defective, 3s but remanded the

case to the trial court with instructions that the trial court should determine
39

whether the will substantially complied with the statutory formalities.
The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that a requirement of strict
compliance with formalities may lead to harsh results.' 4' The Ranney court

approvingly cited a comment in Tentative Draft Number Thirteen of the
Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers. The cited Restatement comment states that even in the absence of a statute specifically

authorizing courts to excuse deviations from the required formalities of
execution, courts should excuse noncompliance with these formalities when
the proponent of a purported will can establish that the testator intended

that document to be the testator's will.' 4' The Ranney court also cited other
cases that purported to follow a rule of substantial compliance.'

42

Although a few courts have applied substantial compliance as a judicial
doctrine, no American wills act expressly authorizes the substantial compliance approach to the formalities of execution.'43 The Australian state of

Queensland, on the other hand, passed a law in 1981 that provides that
substantial compliance with the formalities of execution is sufficient to
validate a will.' 44 Despite this express legislative authorization to excuse
135. Inre Estate of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1339 (N.J.'1991).
136. Id.
137. Id.at 1341.
138. Id.
139. Id.at 1346.
140. Id.at 1343.
141. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoNt,D) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANsFERS app. I, item 3
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1990) for proposition that courts should excuse defects in execution if
proponent of will proves that will is genuine expression of decedent's intent). The American Law
Institute made slight changes to the revised § 33.1 comment g that appears in Appendix I in
Tentative Draft Number 13 before approving the final draft of the Restatement. Comment g in
the final draft of the Restatement states that courts should excuse formal defects in wills when
the execution was in substantial compliance with the formal requirements and the defective will is
a genuine expression of the testator's intent. REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 33.1 cmt. g.
142. See In re Estate of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1343 (N.J. 1991) (listing various cases in
which courts followed substantial compliance rule).
143. See supra note 24 (noting that no state wills act expressly permits substantial compliance
approach).
144. See Rosemary Tobin, The Wills Act Formalities:A Need for Reform, N.Z. L.J., June
1991, at 191, 194 (describing Queensland substantial compliance statute). The Queensland statute
reads as follows: "The court may admit to probate a testamentary instrument executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities prescribed by this section if the court is satisfied that the instrument
expresses the testamentary intention of the testator." See John K. de Groot, Will Execution
Formalities-WhatConstitutesSubstantial Compliance?, QUEENsL. L. Soc'Y J., Apr. 1990, at 93,
93 (setting out text of Queensland substantial compliance statute).
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some defects in execution, the Queensland courts have not moved any
farther away from formalism than have most United States courts that
apply a judicial substantial compliance doctrine.1 4 The Queensland courts
generally have interpreted the substantial compliance statute to mean that
146
courts may excuse only minor deviations from the prescribed formalities.
Queensland courts have demanded that wills express the intent of the testator
and conform almost completely to the required formalities of execution. 47
3.

Dispensing Power

The revised section 2-503 in the 1990 U.P.C. states that courts may
validate a formally defective testamentary instrument provided that the
proponent of the defective document can prove by clear and convincing
4
evidence that the document expresses the genuine intent of the testator. s
The revised section 2-503 advocates an even less stringent approach to
enforcing the wills act formalities than the substantial compliance doctrine:
the dispensing power approach. 149 The dispensing power is not a judicially
created doctrine, but rather is a power given to the courts of a jurisdiction
by the jurisdiction's legislature. 5 0 A dispensing power provision allows
courts, after recognizing defects in a document, nevertheless to validate the
document, provided that the document reflects the intent of the testator.,
Although the dispensing power approach sounds very similar to a broad
substantial compliance approach, three basic differences exist between the
two. First, courts may adopt a substantial compliance approach either with
or without express legislative authorization,5 2 but courts may not use a
dispensing power unless a statute expressly permits the dispensing power
approach.' Second, courts applying a substantial compliance doctrine must

145. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that most American courts that
apply judicial substantial compliance doctrine validate defective wills only if testator almost complied
with formalities of execution).
146. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 44 (explaining that Queensland courts interpret substantial
compliance to be quantitative standard).
147. See id. (explaining that Queensland courts apply substantial compliance doctrine as new
formal requirement in addition to requirement that testator intended document to be will, that is,
testator must have intended document to be his will and testator must nearly have complied with
formalities).
148. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990).
149. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (explaining dispensing power approach
under U.P.C.).
150. See infra note 153 (discussing why legislature must authorize dispensing power approach);
see also Langbein, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that dispensing power is legislative corrective to
harshness of strict compliance rule).
151. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that court using dispensing power approach
may validate defective will that expresses testator's intent).
152. See supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text (discussing judicial doctrine of substantial
compliance and Queensland substantial compliance statute).
153. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that dispensing power approach is not possible
without legislative intervention); Miller, supra note 21, at 689 (stating that dispensing power
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consider whether a purported will is genuine and whether the execution of

the will served the purposes of the wills act formalities, 54 while courts using
a dispensing power approach need consider only whether a purported will
is genuine.'55 Finally, cases from jurisdictions in other countries that have
dispensing power statutes indicate that courts are more willing to excuse

defects under a dispensing
power statute than under the substantial com56
pliance doctrine.
Although no American state has a dispensing power provision in its
wills act, 57 some foreign jurisdictions do have dispensing power provisions.
For example, the Canadian province of Manitoba enacted a !broad dispensing
power statute in 1983.158 The Manitoba statute places only a civil burden

approach is based on express legislative grant of authority to excuse deviation from requirements
of wills act).
The 1989 Proceedings of the American Law Institute indicate that the late Professor A.
James Casner believed courts could adopt a dispensing power approach without express legislative
authorization. See A. James Casner, Discussion of Restatement of Law, Second, of Property, 66
A.L.I. PRoc. 25, 34-35, 41 (1989) (arguing that statute of wills has become obsolete and that
courts therefore may disregard explicit language of statute of wills in order to validate genuine
wills). Casner supported a comment in Tentative Draft Number 12 of the Restatement (Second)
of Propertywhich stated that courts should treat technically defective wills as valid if the proponent
of the will could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will embodied the testator's
intent. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 33.1 cmt. g (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1989).
Casner's view prompted criticism from his colleagues. See Professor Herbert Wenchsler, Discussion
of Restatement of the Law, Second, of Property, 66 A.L.I. PRoc. 25, 41 (1989) (stating his
opinion that no high court would disregard explicit language of statute). Casner's view did not
prevail; the comments to § 33.1 in the final draft of the Restatement (Second) of Property discuss
the dispensing power approach as used in foreign jurisdictions but do not suggest that courts
should adopt the approach without legislative action. See R.STATEmEr, supra note 1, § 33.1 cmt.
g (discussing dispensing power statutes in foreign jurisdictions).
154. See supra notes 122-24, 126-27 and accompanying text (explaining that courts applying
substantial compliance doctrine consider whether execution served purposes of wills act formalities).
155. See Miller, supra note 21, at 689 (contrasting substantial compliance approach and
dispensing power on basis that only substantial compliance approach requires courts to determine
whether execution was in functional compliance with wills act formalities). When Miller uses the
term "functional compliance," he is referring to a level of compliance that fulfills the purposes
or policies underlying the wills act formalities. See id. at 604-05 (discussing notion of functional
compliance). Miller states that South Australian courts applying the South Australian dispensing
power statute focus on the intent of the testator rather than the seriousness of the defect in
execution. Id. at 690.
156. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 11 (arguing that dispensing power is needed because
substantial compliance doctrine does not go far enough in validating formally defective wills);
Langbein, supra note 2, at 1 (declaring substantial compliance provision in Queensland "a flop"
because it is still too strict and advocating dispensing power approach of South Australia).
157. See supra note 24 (explaining that no state wills act expressly authorizes dispensing
power or substantial compliance approach to wills act formalities).
158. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that Manitoba enacted dispensing power statute);
Tobin, supra note 144, at 220 (discussing Manitoba dispensing power statute). The Manitoba
statute reads as follows:
Where, upon application, if the court is satisfied that a document or any writing
on a document embodies
(a) the testamentary intentions of a deceased; or
(b) the intention of a deceased to revoke, alter or revive a will of the deceased or the
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of proof on the proponent of a defective instrument to establish that the
purported will expresses the testator's intent. 59 The Manitoba statute ex6

pressly encompasses defective alterations, revocations, and revivals of wills.1 0
Statutes in four Australian jurisdictions-South Australia, the Northern
Territory, Western Australia, and New South Wales-allow courts to dis-

pense with required formalities if the testator intended the defective document to be the testator's will.' 6' The South Australia statute requires that
the proponent of a defective will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
testator intended the document to be the testator's will before the court

may excuse a formal defect in the document. 162 Despite this high standard
of proof, the South Australia courts have upheld the validity of many wills
with fairly substantial defects, such as an inadequate number of witnesses
or even the lack of the testator's signature.

63

In order for Virginia courts to excuse defects in execution under a
dispensing power approach, the Virginia General Assembly must pass a law
expressly authorizing them to do so.164 Unless the legislature indicated
otherwise, a dispensing power provision would allow Virginia courts to
validate any will expressing the intent of the testator.' 65 In crafting a
testamentary intentions of the deceased embodied in a document other than a will;
the court may, notwithstanding that the document or writing was not executed in
compliance with all the formal requirements imposed by this Act, order that the
document or writing, as the case may be, be fully effective as though it had been
executed in compliance with all the formal requirements imposed by this Act as the will
of the deceased or as the revocation, alteration or revival of the will of the deceased
or of the testamentary intention embodied in that other document, as the case may be.
See R.S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 31, Wills Act § 23, reprinted in RESrATEMdBNT, supra note 1, at stat.
note (setting out text of Manitoba dispensing power statute).
159. Tobin, supra note 144, at 220.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 191-92 (discussing dispensing power statutes in Australia); see also de Groot,
supra note 144, at 93 (noting adoption of dispensing power statutes in South Australia, Western
Australia, and New South Wales).
162. See Tobin, supra note 144, at 192 (discussing South Australia statute). The South
Australia dispensing power statute reads in full:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person
shall, notwitlastanding that it has not been executed with the formalities required by
this Act, be deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme Court, upon
application for admission of the document to probate as the last will of the deceased,
is satisfied that there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the
document to constitute his will.
See de Groot, supra note 144, at 93 (setting out text of South Australia dispensing power statute);
McCue & Kleehamer, supra note 50, at 47 (same).
163. See McCue & Kleehamer, supra note 50, at 47-48 (discussing cases decided under South
Australia dispensing power statute and noting that South Australian courts have probated even
unsigned wills); Langbein, supra note 2, at 15-33 (surveying cases decided under South Australia
dispensing power provision); Miller, supra note 21 (discussing South Australia dispensing power
cases throughout article).
164. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining that courts cannot use dispensing
power approach without legislative authorization).
165. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (stating that courts applying dispensing power
approach need consider only whether purported will expresses intent of testator).
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dispensing power statute, the General Assembly could look to existing
dispensing power statutes in Manitoba and Australia asi well as U.P.C.
section 2-503 as models. 1
II.

VRmINI

IN CONTEXT

To evaluate properly the advisability of a proposed reform, lawyers and
legislators must understand what they are reforming.

act, 16srelevant

67

Consequently, an

examination of Virginia's wills
Virginia case law, 169 and the
fundamentals of Virginia probate procedure'" is necessary in order to
determine whether a dispensing power provision is a desirable addition to
state law. 17' In addition, scholarly arguments concerning dispensing power
provisions are more meaningful when set within the context of Virginia
172

law.

A.

The Virginia Wills Act

Virginia law recognizes both ordinary attested wills'73 and holographic

wills.' 74 The Virginia Code requires that ordinary attested wills be in writing
and signed by the testator or another person in the testator's presence and

at the testator's direction.' 75 The testator's name must appear on the will
in such a manner as to make manifest from the face of the document that
the testator intended the name to serve as the testator's signature. 176 The
testator must sign the will or acknowledge the will in the presence of at

166. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (describing dispensing power statutes in
effect in Manitoba, South Australia, Northern Territory of Australia, Western Australia, and New
South Wales).
167. See, e.g., Chaffin, supra note 33 (discussing Georgia law concerning wills act formalities
before recommending reforms to state wills act).
168. See infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia wills act).
169. See infra notes 191-251 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia cases interpreting
and applying Virginia wills act).
170. See infra notes 253-79 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of Virginia probate
procedure relevant to wills act formalities).
171. See infra notes 280-402 and accompanying text (discussing whether Virginia General
Assembly should adopt dispensing power provision).
172. See infra notes 280-388 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly arguments supporting
and criticizing dispensing power provisions).
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Michie 1950) (providing requirements for attested wills).
174. See id. (setting out requirements for holographs). For a description of Virginia law
authorizing holographic wills and similar statutes in other jurisdictions, see Natale, supra note 5,
at 163-69 (describing Virginia law concerning execution of holographs and similar provisions in
other states). Virginia law also permits nuncupative wills for the personal Iestates of soldiers in
actual military service and sailors at sea. See VA. CODE ANm. § 64.1-53 (Michie 1950) (authorizing
nuncupative wills for soldiers and sailors). Because nuncupative wills are very rare, see Gulliver &
Tilson, supra note 41, at 15 (stating that use of nuncupative wills is limited and rare); Langbein,
supra note 7, at 491 (stating that nuncupative wills are widely authorized but rarely used), this
Note will not discuss the requirements of execution for nuncupative wills.
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Michie 1950).
176. Id.
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least two witnesses who are present at the same time. 77 The witnesses must
subscribe the will in the testator's presence, but no specific form of attestation is necessary. 17 The witnesses must be competent, 79 but witnesses are
not incompetent merely because they have an interest in the will or the
80
estate of the testator.'
A holographic will is invalid in Virginia unless the will is wholly in the
handwriting of the testator.' While the wills act does not require that
witnesses observe the execution of a holographic will, at least two disinterested individuals must testify during probate proceedings that the will is
wholly in the handwriting of the testator.8 2 As in the case of an attested
will, the testator must sign the holograph or have another person sign the
holograph in the testator's presence and at the testator's direction, and the
signature must be made in such a manner as to manifest that the testator
intended the name to serve as the testator's signature.8 3 The statute does
not require that the testator date a holographic wil' 8 4 or that the will be
among the testator's valuable papers and effects at the time of the testator's
death.'85
The Virginia wills act provides three ways in which a testator may
revoke a valid will.8 6 Two of these methods of revocation require that the
testator execute a revoking document with full statutory formality. 87 First,
a testator may revoke some provisions of a will by duly executing a
subsequent will or codicil that is inconsistent with those provisions.'
Second, a testator may revoke a will expressly in another valid will or in a
writing that the testator executes with full statutory formality.8 9 Finally, a

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 64.1-51.
181. Id. § 64.1-49.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see Natale, supra note 5, at 166-67 (explaining that Virginia provision for holographic
wills does not require testator to date holograph). Some states do require that testators date
holographs. See id. (describing date requirement in statutes governing holographs in various
jurisdictions).
185. See Natale, supra note 5, at 169 (indicating that only North Carolina has valuable papers
and effects requirement in statute authorizing holographic wills).
186. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-58.1 (Michie 1950) (authorizing revocation of wills).
187. See id. (describing authorized means of revocation).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see Thompson v. Royall, 175 S.E. 748, 750 (Va. 1934) (holding attempted express
written revocation invalid because testator did not execute revoking writing with full formality);
Johnson, supra note 12, at 13 (noting that Virginia wills act incorporates execution formalities
into provision governing revocation, and stating that this incorporation carries with it rule of strict
compliance with formalities).
In Thompson, the testator decided to revoke her existing valid will and codicil. 175 S.E. at
748. Instead of revoking the documents by destroying them, the testator decided to retain the will
and codicil as memoranda to be used in the event that she should decide to prepare a new will
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testator may revoke a will by burning it, tearing it, or performing certain
other physical acts that damage the document.'90
B.

Construction of the Wills Act in Virginia

The Supreme Court of Virginia has construed many of,the requirements
for the execution of wills set out in the Virginia wills act. For example, the
court has interpreted the requirement that testators sign ,wills. The court
has held that a signature by mark may be a valid signature.' 9' Although
the Virginia wills act does not require that a testator sign at the end of the
will,' 92 the appearance of the testator's name on the will must manifest that
the testator intended the name as a signature. 93 Virginia courts normally
will consider a testator's name or mark that does not appear at the end of
the will to be equivocal rather than a manifest expression of signatory
intent; thus, a name or mark not appearing at the end of a will may not
be a valid signature without additional indications of signatory intent. 94
For instance, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Payne v. Rice'95 that
the testator's name on the will was not a valid signature because the
testator's name appeared somewhere other than the end of the document
and the purported will appeared incomplete.19 On the other hand, the court
decided in Slate v. Titmus 97 that the name of the testator was a valid
signature, although the name did not appear at the end of the will, because
the appearance of the name in the phrase "given under my hand" and
other factors indicated that the testator intended the name on the will to
serve as a signature. 9

in the future. Id. at 748-49. Her attorney wrote on the back of the will's cover and on the back
of the codicil, "This will null and void .

. .,"

and the testator signed these notations. After the

testator's death, some of the beneficiaries under the will offered the will for probate. Id. at 749.
The circuit court probated the will and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's
decision. Id. at 750. The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the testator's attempted revocation
by writing was invalid because the testator did not execute the revoking writing with full formality.
Id. The revoking writing was neither in the testator's handwriting nor accompanied by the
signatures of attesting witnesses. Id. at 749.
190. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-58.1 (Michie 1950) (authorizing revocation of wills by physical
acts).
191. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d 346, 351 (Va. 1948).
192. McElroy v. Rolston, 34 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1945); see HIIAtN, supra note 1, ch. 4,

at 5 (stating that Virginia wills act does not require that testators sign wills at end).
193. Slate v. Titmus, 385 S.E.2d 590, 591 (Va. 1989).
194. See McElroy, 34 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that testator's name appearing somewhere other
than end of will does not clearly indicate that testator intended name as signature).
195. 171 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1970).
196. See Payne v. Rice, 171 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Va. 1970) (holding that testator's name at top
of document did not manifest that testator intended name as signature).
197. 385 S.E.2d 590 (Va. 1989).
198. See Slate v. Titmus, 385 S.E.2d 590, 592 (Va. 1989) (holding that name of testator in
body of document was valid signature due to emphatic phrase in which name appeared and other
factors).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia also has construed the statutory requirement that two people should witness a nonholographic will. The statute
permits the testator either to sign in the presence of witnesses or to

acknowledge the will to them.199 The witnesses' signatures do not have to
be in any particular form or at any particular place on the will.? Witnesses
do not have to realize their status as witnesses when they sign the will;
witnesses may believe they are signing as scribes or notaries public. 20 1 The
requirement that the witnesses be competent means20 2 that they must be
qualified to testify in court concerning the execution.
Concerning the requirements that testators sign or acknowledge wills

"inthe presence" of witnesses and that the witnesses sign "inthe presence"
of testators, the court appears to have adopted a line of sight test. The

presence requirements at least demand that the testator be conscious and
awake when the witnesses sign the will. 203 The court held in Young v.
Barner2°4 that the attestation also must occur in the range of the testator's
vision. 2s5 The court suggested in dictum in Ferguson v. Ferguson20 6 that the
witnesses must be able to see the testator sign in order for the testator to
' 27
be signing "in their presence. 0
Concerning holographic wills, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held
that a court may ignore some nonmaterial writing on the document that is
not in the testator's handwriting. If a question exists as to whether the

199. See Barnes v. Bess, 197 S.E. 403, 406 (Va. 1938) (holding that Virginia wills act permits
testator to sign in presence of witnesses or acknowledge signature to them).
200. Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (Va. 1990).
201. Id. at 739.
202. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d 346, 351 (Va. 1948).
203. See Tucker v. Sandidge, 8 S.E. 650, 662 (Va. 1888) (stating that testator must be
conscious and awake for witnesses to be in testator's presence).
204. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 96 (1876).
205. Young v. Barner, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 96, 106 (1876). When the witnesses were in the
same room as the testator when they signed the will, the Virginia courts will presume that the
witnesses signed in the testator's presence within the meaning of the statute. See Nock v. Nock's
Ex'rs, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 106, 120 (1853) (stating that fact that witnesses signed will while in same
room as testator was prima facie proof that witnesses signed will in presence of testator); Neil v.
Neil, 28 Va. (ILeigh) 6, 20 (1829) (presuming that witnesses signed in presence testator because
witnesses signed while in same room as testator); HAPNm, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 7 (stating that
Virginia courts raise presumption that witnesses were in testator's presence when they signed in
room where testator was located). The Supreme Court of Virginia was equally divided on the
issue of whether the witnesses had signed in the testator's presence when the witnesses signed the
will outside the room where the testator was but the testator could have placed himself in a
position where he could have seen the witnesses sign. Moore v. Moore's Ex'r, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.)
307, 324-25, 327, 331-32 (1851).
206. 47 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 1948).
207. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d 346, 350-51 (Va. 1948) (noting that certain individual
was seated where he could see testator sign will, but not deciding whether testator signed in
presence of that person).
208. See Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 1950) (explaining that court may ignore
some printed language on holograph); Gooch v. Gooch, 113 S.E. 873, 876 (Va. 1922) (holding
that court may ignore printed matter on holograph if handwritten part forms complete will).
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testator intended to incorporate some nonhandwritten material as a substantive portion of the holograph, a court may avoid invalidating the will
by presuming that the holograph did not incorporate the printed matter. 209
If testators alter holographic wills in their own handwriting above the
original signature, the alterations will be valid because Virginia courts will
presume that the testator re-executed the signature. 210 Material added after
the signature, however, normally will not be valid unless it is signed
21
separately. '
The Virginia wills act requires that two disinterested witnesses identify
the testator's handwriting on a holographic will at probate 212 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held in Bowers v. Huddlestong that an expert witness
cannot serve as one of the required witnesses if the expert merely compares
21 4
the purported will with other exemplars of the decedent's handwriting.
Another witness must identify the exemplars as genuine, samples of the
testator's handwriting.

21 5

As construed by the Virginia courts, the Virginia wills act is neither the
most nor the least restrictive of the state wills acts. 2 6 Although it mandates
fewer formalities than do some other state wills acts, 2 7 the Virginia wills
act still provides plenty of opportunities for testators to make errors in
executing wills and revoking wills in writing. 218 Two of the required formalities, attestation by witnesses 219 and the presence requirements, 220 seem
especially formalistic and harsh because they serve little useful purpose in
modern society. 2 '

209. See Moon v. NorveUl, 36 S.E.2d 632, 635 (Va. 1946) (protecting validity of holograph
by deciding that testator did not intend to incorporate typed paragraphs in holograph).
210. Fenton v. Davis, 47 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Va. 1948).
211. See id. at 377 (holding that additions to holograph below signature were not valid part
of will); Triplett v. Triplett's Ex'r., 172 S.E. 162, 167 (Va. 1934) (stating that changes in body of
holograph made in testator's handwriting are admissible to probate).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Michie 1950).
213. 399 S.E.2d 811 (Va. 1991).
214. Bowers v. Huddleston, 399 S.E.2d 811, 812-13 (1991) (holding that handwriting expert
may not serve as one of required witnesses if expert merely compares handwriting on holograph
with exemplars of decedent's handwriting).
215. Id.
216. See RETATEmENT, supra note 1, at stat. note (listing requirements of execution in all
states).
217. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103 (Michie 1987) (requiring that testator sign at
end of will, that person signing as proxy for testator sign his own name, and that testator request
witnesses to sign will).
218. See supra note 189 (describing Virginia case in which court held attempted written
revocation of will ineffective due to formal defect); infra note 317 (listing Virginia cases in which
courts held purported wills invalid due to formal defects).
219. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (describing attestation requirements in
Virginia wills act).
220. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (describing presence requirements in
Virginia wills act).
221. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 320-21 (suggesting that legislature eliminate requirement
that witnesses sign in presence of testator because it serves no important purpose); John E.
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C. Application of the Wills Act in Virginia
Until the middle of this century, Virginia courts demanded strict compliance with the wills act requirements. 2 For example, the Supreme Court
2
of Virginia in the 1945 case of Hamlet v. Hamletm
relied on the strict
compliance doctrine in upholding a trial court's refusal to probate an
unsigned holograph. 224 The Hamlet court rejected the appellant's argument

that the name of the testator, which appeared in the second paragraph of

the document, was a valid signature. 5 Although the principal issue in the
case was what constituted a valid signature under the wills act, the court
noted that Virginia law required strict compliance with formal requirements.
The Hamlet court stated that no mere intention or effort to dispose of
property by will, however clearly and definitely expressed in writing, was
226
sufficient unless executed in the manner mandated by the statute.
The Virginia Supreme Court reiterated its adherence to the strict compliance rule in several other cases during the first half of the 1900s. 227 While

Donaldson, Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to Virginia's Wills Statutes: Part Two, VA. B.
A'N J., Fall 1983, at 10, 16 (recommending that legislature abolish presence requirements because
they do little to increase ceremony or reduce fraud); Lindgren, supra note 24 (arguing throughout
article that legislatures should abolish attestation requirements).
222. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text (discussing strict compliance rule in
Virginia). But see Sturdivant v. Birchett, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 67, 89 (1853) (validating will because
actual execution was reasonable and substantial, if not literal, compliance with required formalities).
In Sturdivant, the witnesses subscribed the will in a different room from the room where the
testator was located. Id. at 68. The court seemed to state that the attestation was not defective
based on precedent, id. at 73, but language at the end of the opinion suggests that the will was
technically defective and the court validated it anyway. Id. at 89; see Johnson, supra note 12, at
14 n.10 (describing Sturdivant as substantial compliance case).
223. 32 S.E.2d 729 (Va. 1945).
224. Hamlet v. Hamlet, 32 S.E.2d 729, 733 (Va. 1945).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 732 (quoting Meany v. Priddy, 102 S.E. 470, 470 (Va. 1920) for proposition that
attempted will is invalid unless testator duly executes will).
227. See McElroy v. Rolston, 34 S.E.2d 241, 244 (Va. 1945) (noting Virginia's adherence to
strict compliance rule). The McElroy court stressed that strict compliance with precise, fixed rules
prevents disorder and confusion in probate law. Id. The McElroy court stated that the importance
of fixed rules outweighs the harsh results that may occur when courts refuse to probate formally
defective wills. Id. In Clarkson v. Bliley, 38 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1946), a case concerning adoption
and intestacy laws, the Supreme Court of Virginia relied on the law of wills as an analogy to
support the court's application of a strict compliance rule. Id. at 27. The Clarkson court described
the strict execution requirements for wills as protective safeguards. Id. The Clarkson court stated
that courts must require strict compliance in order to discourage claims to shares in estates,
whether made in good faith or not, by anyone other than a legal heir or beneficiary of a valid
will. Id. Because execution safeguards are so important, equity could not reform a defective will
no matter how clearly and emphatically the defective document might express testamentary intent.
Id.; accordSpinks v. Rice, 47 S.E.2d 424, 429-30 (Va. 1948) (stating that courts must apply wills
act requirements strictly in all cases).
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the court historically required strict compliance with the wills act formalities,
the court simultaneously stressed that courts should respect the intent of
testators. 228 The court stated that judges therefore should be careful not to
add any requirements to the statute through judicial interpretation. 229
The Virginia Supreme Court tentatively changed its position on the issue
of compliance in the 1950 case of Bell v. Timmins.230 In Bell the appellant
challenged a purported holographic will because some words in the document
were not written in the testator's handwriting. 23 Testimony indicated that
a friend had made some changes to the will at the testator's request in
order to clarify the grammar and punctuation of the will. 232 The changes
did not alter the substance of the will.23
The Bell court appeared to apply the substantial compliance doctrine 2when the court held that the part of the will in the testator's handwriting
was a valid holograph despite the presence of other writing on the document. 23s The Bell court had no doubt that the purported will was a genuine
expression of the testator's intent: the court stated that the case did not
involve concealment or forgery 236 and that the will undoubtedly was valid
before the testator's friend altered the will.237 The Bell court also considered
the purposes of the required formalities and the degree to which the
contested will deviated from those formalities. The court explained that the
legislature did not intend the requirements of the wills! act to restrain
testators, but to protect them.238 In the circumstances of the Bell case, the
court noted that the alterations that the testator's friend added to the will
were de minimis and immaterial.? 9 The court concluded that courts should

228. See Moon v. Norvell, 36 S.E.2d 632, 634-35 (Va. 1946) (noting that wills act was not
intended to restrain testators and stating that courts should interpret genuine expressions of
testamentary intent to protect their validity whenever possible).
229. See Savage v. Bowen, 49 S.E. 668, 669-70 (Va. 1905) (stating that courts should follow
wills act strictly but not add any requirements to it).
230. 58 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1950). Whether the Bell court needed to apply the doctrine of
substantial compliance to reach its decision is unclear because the court construed the formality
at issue, the handwriting requirement for holographs, very broadly. See id. at 58-59 (explaining
that requirement that holograph be "wholly" in handwriting of testator does not demand that
will be 100% in handwriting of testator).
231. Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1950).
232. Id.at 57.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 60 (explaining that courts should insist upon substantial compliance with wills
acts). Although the Bell court stated that it did not intend to relax the statutory requirements, id.
at 59, both the reasoning and the decision in the case reflect a substantial compliance approach.
235. See id. at 63 (holding that lower court was correct in admitting to probate holograph
as originally written by testator).
236. Id.at 57.
237. Id. at 58.
238. Id. at 60 (quoting Moon v. Norvell, 36 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Va. 1946) for proposition that
purpose of wills act is not to restrain testators).
239. Id.
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give the statute requiring formalities of execution a fair construction and
insist upon substantialcompliance with the statute.
In the 1990 case Robinson v. Ward,2" the Virginia Supreme Court again
applied the substantial compliance doctrine.2 2 The testator dictated her will
to a friend, Ward.2 3 Because Ward was the first named beneficiary, Ward
wrote her own name in the first line of the will.? 4 When Ward had completed
241 The testator later
the document, the testator read it over and signed it.
acknowledged the will to a doctor, who signed it as a witness in the presence
of Ward and the testator. 24 The testator's heirs challenged the will on the
grounds that only one witness had signed the will properly because Ward's
name in the first line of the will was not a valid witness's signature. 247
The court in "Robinsonheld that sufficient subscription by Ward existed
to constitute substantial compliance with the controlling statute.2 The court
in Robinson stressed that the evidence disclosed no hint of fraud, that the
testator had the capacity to make a will, and that the purported will
accurately expressed the testator's intentions. 249 The court quoted language
from the 1853 case of Sturdivant v. Birchett25 for the proposition that a
reasonable and substantial compliance with the required formalities should
suffice.211 Thus, the substantial compliance rule is currently the law in
Virginia, but the Virginia Supreme Court has applied the substantial compliance doctrine in only two modern cases.
D. Aspects of Virginia Probate ProcedureRelated to the Wills Act
Formalities2
1. Jurisdiction over Probate Matters
Because much of the criticism that scholars have directed at dispensing
power provisions concerns the overall competency of probate courts and
240. Id.
241. 387 S.E.2d 735 (Va. 1990).
242. See Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 739 (Va. 1990) (holding that signing by witness
substantially complied with statutory requirements).
243. Id. at 737.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 738.
248. Id. at 739; see Johnson, supra note 12 at 10-11 (describing Robinson as substantial
compliance case).
249. Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 739 (Va. 1990).
250. Sturdivant v. Birchett, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 67 (1853).
251. Robinson, 387 S.E.2d at 740 (quoting Sturdivant, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) at 89, for proposition
that courts should require only substantial compliance with wills act formalities).
252. For a detailed discussion of probate and estate administration matters beyond the scope
of this Note, see Andrew H. Hook, Special Problems in Probate Administration, in VRGIRNA
PRoaATE: BEYoND Tim BAsics 123, 125-36 (National Business Inst., Inc. ed., 1989) (discussing
estate administration in Virginia); Robert A. Hickey, ProbateProceduresand Administration, in
ESTATE PLANNING AND PRaoATE IN VmGnIA 239, 241-80 (National Business Inst., Inc. ed., 1992)
(discussing recent developments in probate law and providing overview of attorney's duties during
probate and administration of estate).
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the thorny proof problems that could arise in dispensing power cases,2 3 a
brief examination of Virginia probate procedure is essential in order to
determine whether Virginia should adopt a dispensing power statute. Virginia
confers probate jurisdiction by statute upon the state's circuit courts. 2 4 The

clerks of such courts have the authority to determine whether a will is valid,
including whether the testator properly executed the will, in an ex parte
proceeding.25 Sometimes, however, a circuit court judge may make the
6
initial determination of a will's validity in an inter partes proceeding.25
The Virginia Code grants circuit courts the authority to impeach or

establish a will after a clerk has made an order concerning the will in an
ex parte proceeding. 2 7 Any interested party can appeal to the circuit court
as a matter of right from a clerk's order admitting or refusing to admit a
will to probate.2 s In such an appeal, the circuit court will review the issues
259
de novo.

253. See infra notes 350-80 and accompanying text (explaining that some schlars criticize
dispensing power provisions because such provisions confer broad discretion on probate courts
and may present difficult proof problems).
254. See VA. CODE AiN. § 64.1-75 (Michie 1950) (conferring probate jurisdiction upon circuit
courts); W. HAmILTON BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VnRoDUA CivIi PRocEDuRE 81 (2d ed. 1989) (stating
that Virginia statutes confer probate jurisdiction upon circuit courts); JAuEs G. ARTHuR ET AL.,
BAsic PROBATE IN ViRGINIA 5 (1990) (stating that Virginia circuit courts and circuit court clerks
have jurisdiction over probate matters).
255. See VA. CODE AN. § 64.1-77 (Michie 1950) (stating that clerks may probate wills);
BRYSON, supra note 254, at 81 (stating that clerks enter probate orders in ex parte proceedings).
Ex parte proceedings are judicial or quasi-judicial hearings in which the decisionmaker hears only
one party. BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
256. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-80 (Michie 1950) (authorizing inter partes probate proceedings
before circuit court judges); ARTmnu ET AL., supra note 254, at 32 (noting that circuit court judge
may probate will in inter partes proceeding). Parties in an inter partes probate proceeding may
request a jury, and the decision in the proceeding bars the parties from filing a bill in equity to
impeach or establish the will. See id. An inter partes probate proceeding normally is used when
a question exists as to the validity of the will and some potential challengers are under a disability.
Bruce Lee Mertens, Probate Litigation, in VmGnmi PROBATE: B'YOND Tim BASICs 139, 142
(National Business Inst., Inc. ed., 1989).
257. See BRYSON, supra note 254, at 81 (stating that circuit courts have power to impeach
or establish wills after clerk has made order in ex parte probate proceeding). The power to impeach
or establish wills is part of the circuit courts' equity jurisdiction. Id.
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-78 (Michie 1950) (authorizing appeals from clerk's order to
circuit court by any interested party); see HAPNER, supra note 1, ch. 8, at 4 (stating that interested
parties can appeal clerk's order as matter of right); Mertens, supra note 256, at 141 (stating that
any interested party may appeal clerk's order as matter of right to circuit court within six months
of date of order).
259. VA. CODE AN. § 64.1-78 (Michie 1950); see Mertens, supra note 256, at 141 (stating
that any interested party may appeal clerk's order to circuit court for de novo review). Appellants
must file appeals under § 64.1-78 within six months of the date of the clerk's order. See id. A
person who was not a party in a hearing which resulted in a clerk's order admitting or refusing
to admit a will to probate has 12 months in which to appeal the order to the circuit court. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-88 to -89 (Michie 1950) (authorizing persons not parties in proceeding
before clerk to bring bill of complaint in equity to circuit court within one year of order); Mertens,
supra note 256, at 141 (discussing §§ 64.1-88 to -89).
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26
The Virginia Supreme Court has the authority to review probate cases, 0

but the Virginia Court of Appeals does not. 261 The civil jurisdiction of the
Virginia Court of Appeals is limited. 262 The General Assembly did not grant
the court of appeals jurisdiction to review probate decisions either as part
of that court's original 263 or appellate jurisdiction. 2" Thus, a party aggrieved
by a probate proceeding must file a petition for review directly with the
Virginia Supreme Court.
Decisions concerning whether testators properly executed wills are currently in the hands of circuit court clerks and judges. 265 Unless the Virginia

legislature expressly stated otherwise, 2" the circuit court clerks and judges
267
would handle the application of any dispensing power statute in Virginia.
Because the Virginia Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over probate
matters,26s the Virginia Supreme Court would be the sole state tribunal with
authority to review the circuit courts' decisions under a dispensing power
provision.2 9
2. Evidentiary Issues in Probate Proceedings
The proponents of a purported will must prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the testator validly executed the document offered for
probate 270 and that the testator executed the document with testamentary
intent. 27' Once the proponents prove testamentary intent and due execution,

260. See BRYSON, supra note 254, at 82 (stating that Virginia Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over probate matters).
261. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (describing jurisdiction of Virginia Court
of Appeals).
262. See County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Va. Ct.
App. Sept. 4, 1985) (stating that civil jurisdiction of Virginia Court of Appeals is limited).
263. See VA. CoDa ANN. § 17-116.04 (Michie 1950) (outlining original jurisdiction of Virginia
Court of Appeals).
264. See id. §§ 17-116.05-05:1 (describing appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals).
265. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text (explaining that circuit court clerks and
judges have jurisdiction over probate).
266. See H.D. 2160, Va. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993) (requiring that circuit court judges,
not clerks, hear all dispensing power cases in inter partes proceedings). This proposed bill
demonstrates that the legislature is free to require that courts use certain procedures in hearing
dispensing power cases. See H.D. 2160 (specifying that judges must hear dispensing power cases
in inter partes proceedings). This bill, which proposed a dispensing power statute for Virginia,
died in committee during the 1993 session of the Virginia General Assembly. See supra notes 2627 (describing proposed bill and fate of bill in 1993 session of legislature).
267. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text (noting that circuit court clerks and
judges handle probate).
268. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text (noting that Virginia Court of Appeals
lacks jurisdiction over probate matters).
269. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court of Virginia has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from probate proceedings in circuit courts).
270. See Cross v. Grimes, 37 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1946) (stating that burden is on proponents
of document to prove due execution by preponderance of evidence).
271. See McElroy v. Rolston, 34 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1945) (stating that proponents must
prove testamentary intent and valid execution).
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the burden of proof shifts to the challengers to establish that the will is
invalid. 272 Testators and their lawyers wish to do everything possible to
273
make proof of due execution a routine matter.

The Supreme Court of Virginia uniformly has held that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that a document was executed with testamentary intent. 274 The court also has refused to admit extrinsic evidence to
prove that the testator complied with certain required formalities of execution. 27 Extrinsic evidence is admissable, however, for other purposes in
probate cases. 276 For example, in cases involving lost wills, the court has
allowed the proponents and the challengers of purported wills to introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the making of
a will and declarations made by the testator. 277 Extrinsic evidence also is
admissible to prove that the handwriting on a holographic will is the

testator's 278 because the wills act requires that two witnesses testify at probate
as to the handwriting's genuineness. 279 Thus, the Virginia circuit courts do
use extrinsic evidence in many probate cases.
III.

POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A DISPENSING POWER
PROVISION FOR VIRGINIA

A.

Promoting the Testator's Intent

Carrying out the testator's intent is the rallying cry of dispensing power
proponents. 2 0 Certainly the many cases in which courts have stated that
272. See Croft v. Snidow, 33 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Va. 1945) (stating that contestants must carry
burden of proof to show testamentary incapacity after proponents show due execution of purported
will).
273. See Donaldson, supra note 221, at 17 (recommending that lawyers follow established
practices in will execution even if Virginia reduces number of formalities, because certain formalities
assure convenience of probate); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 547 (noting that need to persuade
court to admit will to probate provides incentive for testators to comply with formalities).
274. See, e.g., Mumaw v. Mumaw, 203 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Va. 1974) (stating that testamentary
intent must be clear from face of purported will); Quesenberry v. Funk, 125 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Va.
1962) (stating that final testamentary intent must be clear on face of purported will or codicil);
Fenton v. Davis, 47 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Va. 1948) (stating that extrinsic evidence is not admissible
to establish testamentary intent); HAmNRm, supra note 1, ch. 4, at I (stating that face of purported
will must indicate that testator intended document to be her will).
275. See Slate v. Titmus, 385 S.E.2d 590, 591 (Va. 1989) (stating that signature must appear
proper from internal evidence); Payne v. Rice, 171 S.E.2d 826, 828 (Va. 1970) (refusing to admit
extrinsic evidence on issue of whether signature was valid under wills act).
276. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (referring to certain probate matters in
which Virginia courts admit extrinsic evidence).
277. See Tate v. Wren, 40 S.E.2d 188, 193 (Va. 1947) (stating that testator's declarations are
admissible to strengthen or rebut presumption that testator revoked lost will); Bowery v. Webber,
23 S.E.2d 766-67 (Va. 1943) (admitting evidence of testator's affection for granddaughter to rebut
presumption that testator had destroyed lost will that devised property to granddaughter).
278. See Bowers v. Huddleston, 399 S.E.2d 811, 811-12 (Va. 1991) (explaining that one lay
witness and one expert witness testified as to genuineness of handwriting); J. Rodney Johnson,
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 25 U. RicH. L. Rav. 925, 939-40 (1991) (discussing Bowers).
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Michie 1950).
280. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that stringent application of wills act formalities
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purported wills were genuine expressions of the testators' intent but refused

to probate the documents due to technical errors seem harsh. 2ss When courts
refuse to probate wills, property not otherwise disposed of by the testator
passes by intestate succession. 2 2 Because the distribution plans of state

intestacy statutes frequently do not reflect the dispositive preferences of
decedents, 2 3 the net result of a technical defect in execution is often that
the decedent's property passes to individuals to whom the decedent did not
wish to give the property.2 4

Opponents of dispensing power statutes, however, argue that the formalities of execution promote the intent of testators. 2 5 The formalities
leads to invalidation of genuine wills, and advocating harmless error rule); R.T. Oerton, Dispensing
with the Formalities, 141 NEw L.J. 1416, 1416 (1991) (advocating partial dispensing power to
prevent courts from invalidating wills that courts know to be genuine); Tobin, supra note 144, at
195, 220 (recommending that New Zealand adopt dispensing power statute to promote intent of
testators). Some scholars who have not gone so far as to advocate a dispensing power approach
to formalities of execution also have noted that rigid insistence on strict compliance with statutory
formalities defeats the intent of testators. See Fassberg, supra note 5, at 636-39 (advocating that
courts apply formalities functionally rather than formalistically because refusal to probate wills
undercuts the intent of testators); Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 2, 2 n.2 (stating that courts
should favor effectuating intent of testators but noting that formalities of execution may frustrate
intent).
281. See, e.g., In re Smith v. Nelson, 299 S.W.2d 645, 645 (Ark. 1957) (holding typed will
invalid solely because only one witness had signed will and statute required two witnesses); Estate
of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1010, 1015 (N.J. 1987) (invalidating will because witnesses did not sign
within reasonable time after testator made will, as required by statute); Ross v. Taylor, 165 N.W.
1079, 1080 (S.D. 1917) (holding will invalid because testator did not declare to witnesses that
document was testator's will, and state wills act required such a declaration); Miller, supra note
69, at 561-62 (summarizing several British cases in which wills were invalid due to technical defects,
and describing these cases as harsh); Oerton, supra note 280, at 1416 (summarizing British case
in which court refused to admit to probate alterations testator wrote on will because testator did
not sign alterations); see also James F. Baxley, Case Comment, 17 SEroN HAIn L. REv 180, 181
(1987) (discussing prior history of Peters case).
282. See supra note 9 (stating that property not otherwise disposed of at testator's death
passes under intestacy laws).
283. See Fellows, supra note 9, at 323-24, 340-84 (describing intestacy statutes that do not
reflect decedent's wishes as trap for ignorant and misinformed and analyzing several ways in which
intestacy statutes deviate from dispositive preferences of most decedents); Mary Ann Glendon,
Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 Tut. L. REv.
1165, 1190 (1986) (stating that some intestacy statutes limit share of estate which passes to spouse
when children of decedent are alive, despite fact that most Americans would not want to limit
spouse's share of estate in this situation); Mann, supra note 5, at 67 n.142 (stating that intestacy
statutes often do not reflect desires of decedents); Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison
of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate
Codes, 63 IowA L. Rnv. 1041, 1047, 1078-113 (1978) (noting that intestacy statutes reflect tradition
more than social science data and demonstrating that some provisions of Iowa's intestacy law do
not reflect dispositive preferences of Iowa public).
284. See supra note 283 (explaining that intestacy statutes often do not correspond with
dispositive preferences of testators). In Peters the purported will that the court refused to admit
to probate left the testator's estate to his stepson, but the decedent's estate ultimately escheated
to the state of New Jersey under the state's intestacy statute. Peters, 526 A.2d at 1006.
285. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (explaining why dispensing power critics
believe formalities of execution promote intent of testators).
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protect the testator from fraud 216 and undue influence 28 7 during the execution
of the will.2as After testators are dead and therefore cannot testify concerning

their intent, 219 the requirements prevent lying witnesses from persuading
courts to admit to probate oral statements
or informal writings that the
29
testators never intended to be their wills.

0

On the issue of promoting the testator's intent, the proponents of the
dispensing power carry the field. Several scholars have stated that the
protective function of the wills act formalities is nearly obsolete today
because many wills are made by healthy testators in lawyers' offices. 291
Furthermore, because most of the fraud and duress that wrongdoers practice
on testators does not occur during the execution ceremony, 292 the formalities
are not a very effective protective device. 293 A clever wrongdoer who did
choose to act during the execution ceremony would make certain that the
testator executed the will correctly. 294 Additionally, a party who suspects
286. See HIPNmt, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 6-8 (describing fraud and how litigators must prove
fraud in Virginia probate cases); REPPY & Torsscs, supra note 1, at 20-21 (describing three basic
kinds of fraud in wills cases); Milton D. Green, Fraud,Undue Influence, andMental Incompetency,
43 CoLutm. L. REv. 176, 179 (1943) (defining fraud as conscious misrepresentation or concealment
made with intent to influence another to enter or refrain from entering transaction); A.J. White
Hutton, Undue Influence and Fraudin Wills, 37 DICK. L. REv. 16, 43-53 (1932) (setting out basic
rules of law concerning fraud in wills and describing how litigators prove fraud in probate matters).
287. See HAPNER, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 6-9 (describing undue influence and how to prove
undue influence in Virginia probate cases); Green, supra note 286, at 180 (stating that undue
influence occurs when party in dominant relationship over another uses unfair persuasion to induce
weaker party to act).
288. See Clougherty, supra note 31, at 283, 290 (arguing that excusing noncompliance with
certain witnessing requirements could increase danger of fraud); supra note 50 and accompanying
text (explaining function of formalities to protect testators from fraud and undue influence).
289. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 298 (stating that testator cannot defend himself against
fraud during probate proceedings because testator will be dead before probate begins); Victor A.
Sachse III, Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, of Property, 66 A.L.I. PRoc. 25, 36
(1989) (stating that testator is dead during probate and unable to speak on her own behalf).
290. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 6 n.15 (discussing nearly successful fraud in
fifteenth century English probate case in which witnesses falsely testified that decedent had made
oral will leaving his estate to his wife); Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 339 (same).
291. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 9 (stating that retaining formalities of execution
for protective purposes is difficult to justify in modern conditions); Lindgren, supra note 24, at
554 (stating that protective functions of wills act formalities are less important today due to decline
in deathbed wills); Mann, supra note 5, at 49 (arguing that testators need less protection today
because many testators execute wills in lawyers' offices).
292. See HAPNER, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 8 (stating that "fraud in inducement" is more
prevalent than "fraud in execution"); I HauusoN, supra note 1, § 114 (stating that fraud most
usually noted in cases and books is type of fraud in inducement, not fraud during execution of
will); Green, supra note 286, at 197-98 (listing several cases of fraud in wills, none of which
involve fraud at time of execution); Nelson & Starck, supra note 36, at 352 (stating that undue
influence normally occurs over long period of time rather than merely during execution of will).
293. See Mechem, supra note 31, at 504-05 (arguing that forgery of wills is not great hazard
and that presence of witnesses at execution of will not stop fraud during execution).
294. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 11 (stating that schemers who seek to procure wills
through fraud or undue influence will be able to comply with required formalities easily); Lindgren,
supra note 24, at 562 (stating that most wrongdoers who practice fraud on testators comply with
statutory formalities).
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that a beneficiary under a will exercised fraud or undue influence on the
testator can challenge the will on these grounds regardless of the existence
of a dispensing power statute. 295
The Virginia legislature already has undermined the protective function
of the wills act formalities by providing in the wills act that holographic

wills are valid 296 when testators meet a few minimal requirements. 297 The
handwriting requirement alone provides little protection to testators. Because
the Virginia wills act does not require that witnesses attest holographs, 291 a

wrongdoer can procure a holographic will naming the wrongdoer as a
beneficiary as easily as the wrongdoer could obtain a ransom note. 299
Refusing to enact a dispensing power statute because of a desire to protect
testators would be incongruous with Virginia's evident policy choice in the
area of holographic wills that little protection of testators is necessary.
Although testators are dead before probate 3°° and therefore unable to
defend themselves if hopeful beneficiaries present false wills to the probate
court,3 01 a dispensing power statute would not enable wrongdoers to establish
false wills easily.30 2 The proponent of a defective will has the burden of
proof in a proceeding to have the will admitted to probate under a dispensing
power statute.30 3 The U.P.C. recommends that courts require clear and

295. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 9 (noting existence of independent remedies for
fraud and undue influence); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 562 (stating that party who suspected
fraud or undue influence had occurred in probate case could challenge will on these grounds even
if attestation requirements were completely abolished).
296. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 498 (arguing that allowing holographs reveals legislative
policy to abandon protective policy of wills act formalities); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 558
(stating that handwriting requirement for holographic wills provides little protection against forgery);
Natale, supra note 5, at 169 n.60 (stating that most false wills are holographs).
297. See supra notes 181-85, 208-15 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for
holographic wills in Virginia).
298. See Mann, supra note 5, at 50 (noting that holographic wills are valid without attestation);
Rees, supra note 5, at 634 (explaining that witnesses are not required to attest holographic wills);
supra notes 181-85, 208-15 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for holographs in

Virginia).
299. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 41, at 13-14 (noting that undue influence is danger in
execution of holographs because wrongdoer can obtain holograph as easily as ransom note);
Langbein, supra note 7, at 497 (noting that requirements for execution of holographs do not offer
testators much protection because wrongdoers can obtain holographs by compulsion); Natale,
supra note 5, at 160 n.7 (noting that risk of fraud and duress exists in execution of holographs
despite requirement that holographs be in testators' handwriting).
300. See supra note 289 (listing authority for proposition that testators generally are dead
before probate). But see RcmH, supra note 4, at 337 n.15 (explaining that probate may occur
when statutes presume absentee testator dead, but court will set aside probate if testator later
appears); Mechem, supra note 31, at 521 (mentioning that states could permit ante-mortem probate
by statute).
301. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (noting that testators are unable to testify
during probate proceedings).
302. See infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text (listing reasons that dispensing power
would not allow wrongdoers to easily establish false wills).
303. See Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, section amending the Wills Act of 1936,
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convincing evidence of genuinenessc 4 not merely a preponderance of the
evidence,305 before admitting a document to probate under a dispensing
power provision. The experience of South Australia with its dispensing
power statute3°0 indicates that courts would hesitate to admit oral wills or
unsigned wills to probate because of the difficulty in establishing testamen3°7
tary intent for wills that have such large formal defects.
Not only do the opponents of a dispensing power approach overemphasize the protective function of the wills act formalities, 08 but they also
seem to forget that the laws should promote the intent of all testators. 3 9
The wills acts should not be so complex that they punish poor testators
who cannot afford good lawyers. 10 Virginia should be especially sensitive
to promoting the expressed intent of testators who do not seek legal advice
in preparing wills because Virginia recognizes holographic wills, 311 which
312
generally are homemade wills.
The recent willingness of the Virginia Supreme Court to apply some
kind of substantial compliance doctrine to will execution cases is commendable. 1 3 However, a dispensing power statute would provide much clearer
authorization for courts to uphold the intent of bumbling testators than

§ 12(2), 8 S. Ausn. STAT. 665 (placing burden of proof on proponents of purported will to prove
testamentary intent beyond reasonable doubt); U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (placing burden on proponents
of technically defective will to prove by clear and convincing evidence that document expresses
testamentary intent of decedent).
304. See U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (stating that burden of proof under statute is clear and
convincing evidence); Miller, supra note 21, at 701-02 (stating that U.P.C. raised required level of
proof from civil preponderance of evidence standard that Langbein originally favored to clear and
convincing evidence standard).
305. See supra note 314 (discussing standard of proof under U.P.C. § 2-503).
306. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing dispensing power law in South
Australia).
307. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 22 (stating that South Australia dispensing power cases
indicate that courts are less likely to dispense with writing and signature requirements than presence
and attestation requirements because writing and signature requirements have great evidentiary and
cautionary value).
308. See supra notes 291-307 and accompanying text (discussing why dispensing power will
not undermine protective function of wills act formalities).
309. See Mechem, supra note 31, at 503 (stating that testators who do not employ lawyers
have same right to make wills as their more prosperous or sophisticated brothers and sisters who
employ good lawyers).
310. See Lindgren, supra note 24, at 545 (stating that wills acts should not punish testators
because they could not afford to hire good lawyers); Mann, supra note 5, at 51 (stating that
errors in attestation are almost always fault of attorneys); Mechem, supra note 31, at 503 (arguing
that wills act should not assume all testators make wills in offices of large law fins).
311. See supra notes 174, 181-85 and accompanying text (noting that Virginia recognizes
holographs as valid wills when testators fulfill certain requirements).
312. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 324-25 (noting that holographs are informal and are
useful for people who cannot obtain legal assistance); Natale, supra note 5, at 160 (stating that
purpose of allowing holographs is to permit private dispositions without complexities); infra note
348 and accompanying text (noting that many holographs are letters or notes left in desk drawers).
313. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing substantial compliance cases
in Virginia).

19931

DISPENSING POWER

1181

either a judicial substantial compliance doctrine or a substantial compliance
statute. 1 4 Having decided only two substantial compliance cases" 5 after
moving away from a strict compliance rule,31 6 the Virginia Supreme Court
has not clarified what kinds of formal defects Virginia courts may excuse
through the substantial compliance doctrine. Many cases in the Virginia
Reports tell the sad stories of documents that were clearly meant to be wills

were denied probate because of formal defects in their execubut which
7
tion.

31

Because a dispensing power statute would promote the intent of testators,318 a discussion of whether Virginia should adopt a dispensing power
statute should focus on a single issue: would a dispensifig power statute

violate any public policy concerns that outweigh the policy of effectuating
the intent of testators? 3 9 The scholarship on will formalities discusses several
social policies that a dispensing power statute might violate.3 20 The following

examination of these competing policy concerns reveals that none outweighs
the policy of promoting the intent of testators. 32 1 However, the criticisms
of the dispensing power approach discussed below suggest potential weaknesses of the approach that the Virginia legislature should seek to avoid by

careful consideration and322drafting if the legislature does decide to enact a
dispensing power statute.

B. Litigation Levels
A dispensing power provision could increase litigation by encouraging
parties to argue that technically defective wills are genuine.123 While an
314. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 1, 41-45 (stating that Queensland substantial compliance
statute is much less successful than South Australia dispensing power statute because courts will
excuse only very minor defects under substantial compliance statute); Miller, supra note 21, at
689 (stating that dispensing power seems by definition to give courts broader discretion than
judicial doctrine of substantial compliance).
315. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia substantial compliance
cases).
316. See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text (discussing traditional rule of strict
compliance in Virginia).
317. See, e.g., Payne v. Rice, 171 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Va. 1970) (holding will invalid because
testator did not sign will properly); Fenton v. Davis, 47 S.E.2d 372, 377 (Va. 1948) (holding that
section of holograph testator wrote under signature after original execution was invalid because
testator did not sign additions); Tucker v. Sandidge, 8 S.E. 650, 662 (Va. 1888) (holding will
invalid because testator slipped into unconsciousness before witnesses could sign will in testator's
conscious presence, as required by wills act).
318. See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text (arguing that dispensing power statutes
promote intent of testators).
319. See infra notes 323-88 and accompanying text (discussing public policies that dispensing
power approach could violate and arguing that these policies do not outweigh policy of promoting
testators' intent).
320. See infra notes 323-80 and accompanying text (discussing public policies that dispensing
power statute could violate).
321. See infra notes 323-88 and accompanying text (examining competing policy concerns and
arguing that none outweighs policy of promoting testators' intent).
322. See infra notes 386, 388 and accompanying text (discussing issues legislature should
consider in drafting dispensing power statute).
323. See Miller, supra note 69, at 578-79 (noting that dispensing power provision could
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English study found that very few wills presented for probate were technically defective and therefore fodder for dispensing power cases, a24 many
more people might present technically defective wills for probate if the rules
for admitting wills to probate were more flexible.3 25 Some scholars suggest
that adopting a dispensing power rule would cause at least an initial increase
in litigation levels,3 26 especially if the legislature gave the courts few guide327
lines for applying the dispensing power statute.
The South Australia dispensing power statute did increase probate
8
litigation in the first few years after the legislature passed the statute.2
Professor Langbein blames the increase in litigation levels not on the
dispensing power statute itself, but on a South Australia rule of procedure
that prevents parties who stand to benefit from a purported will from
waiving their right to seek probate of the will.3 29 No such procedural quirk

exists in Virginia; Virginia law does not insist that parties present a purported
330
will for probate if all the interested parties agree to suppress the will.

Some of the cases litigated in South Australia therefore would not have
3
been litigated in Virginia.1 1
A decrease in the number of technical challenges to wills would offset
3 32
any increases in litigation that a dispensing power statute might cause.
promote litigation); Clougherty, supra note 31, at 289 (stating that dispensing power statutes will
increase litigation by disrupting channeling function of formalities).
324. See Miller, supra note 69, at 579 (stating that study in England in 1978 found that
fewer than 400 wills presented for probate per year are technically defective); Oerton, supra note
286, at 1418 (discussing same study).
325. See Miller, supra note 69, at 579 (stating that more people might present defective wills
for probate if dispensing power provision were in effect); Oerton, supra note 280, at 1418 (stating
that statistics concerning how many technically defective wills people presented for probate do not
include probably far greater number of cases in which people saw that courts were bound to reject
defective wills and therefore did not submit wills at all). But see Fassberg, supra note 5, at 647
(arguing that proponents of wills will rarely invoke dispensing power because proponents must
prove testamentary intent to court).
326. See Miller, supra note 21, at 706 (stating that adoption of dispensing power rule would
cause initial increase in probate litigation because courts would need to determine parameters of
rule through application); supra note 323 (citing authorities for proposition that dispensing power
provision could increase litigation).
327. See Glendon, supra note 283, at 1190-91, 1195-96 (stating that granting courts too much
discretion promotes litigation and recommending that legislatures set out in statutes clear guidelines
for judges).
328. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 37-38 (describing litigation "boomlet" that followed
adoption of dispensing power statute in South Australia).
329. See id. (arguing that litigation increase in South Australia occurred because interested
parties in South Australia probate cases cannot waive their rights).
330. See ARTHUR ET A., supra note 254, at 7 (stating that Virginia law does not require
courts to probate will if no one requests probate of will); M.L. Cross, Family Settlement of
Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3D 8, 39-43 (1970) (noting general rule that all interested parties may
agree to suppress will). Fraudulent concealment of a will, however, is a crime in Virginia. ARrm
ET AL., supra note 254, at 7.
331. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 41 (stating that adopting dispensing power rule will not
lead to litigation boom in jurisdictions that allow noncourt processing of uncontested estates).
332. See Lindgren, supra note 24, at 572 (noting that under strict compliance rule, parties
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When courts do not have the power to excuse technical errors in will
execution, every formality becomes a fruitful ground for will contests.333
People would be less likely to contest wills on formal grounds if courts had
the power to excuse formal defects.33 4 The two substantial compliance cases
from the Virginia Supreme Court335 do little to discourage will contests on
the grounds of formal defects3 36 because the cases deal with relatively minor
formal defects 33 7 and their holdings are narrow. 338
C.

Undermining the Ritual Function of the Formalities

To the extent that a dispensing power provision discourages compliance
with the statutory formalities, 339 the provision would reduce the level of
ceremony surrounding will execution and therefore would undercut the ritual
function of the formalities. 34 Most probate law scholars agree, however,
that a dispensing power provision would not discourage testators from

litigate whether testator complied with formalities); Miller, supra note 69, at 578 (noting that
decrease in purely technical challenges could offset any increase in litigation caused by dispensing
power statute); Oerton, supra note 280, at 1418 (noting existence of strong arguments that
introduction of dispensing power would reduce litigation). Oerton notes that because people
ordinarily do not litigate cases which they are certain to lose, no case in which strong evidence of
genuineness existed would need come before the courts at all if a dispensing power statue were in
place. Id.
333. See Gerry W. Beyer, Drafting in Contemplation of Will Contests, PRAc. LAw., Jan.
1992, at 61, 68 (noting that sloppy execution ceremony provides ammunition for parties who wish
to contest will); Donaldson, supra note 221, at 16 (stating that each formality required for valid
will execution presents potential source of litigation as to whether testator in fact observed such
formality); Mann, supra note 5, at 64 (demonstrating how strict compliance rule has prompted
high volume of litigation concerning what constitutes compliance with various formalities).
334. See Professor A. James Casner, Discussion of Restatement of the Law, Second, of
Property, 66 A.L.I. PRoc. 25, 29-30 (1989) (suggesting that dispensing power would eliminate
litigation over will formalities); supra note 332 (explaining that dispensing power statute would
reduce litigation concerning whether testator technically complied with formalities of execution).
335. Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735 (Va. 1990); Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55 (Va.
1950); see supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing Robinson and Bell).
336. See supra note 333 (indicating that every formality which courts cannot excuse becomes
fruitful ground for litigation).
337. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia substantial compliance
cases). In Bell the Supreme Court of Virginia excused a deviation from the requirement that
holographs be entirely in the handwriting of the testator; the part of the will which the testator
did not write did not affect the substance of the will. See supra notes 230-40 (discussing holding
in Bell). In Robinson the Supreme Court of Virginia permitted the name of a beneficiary in a
dispositive clause to serve as a witness's signature despite the fact that the beneficiary did not
intend to act as a witness. 387 S.E.2d at 740. Because earlier Virginia cases had stated that
witnesses did not always need to realize their status as witnesses during the execution of a will,
id. at 739, the formal defect in Robinson must have been quite minor.
338. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (demonstrating that particular facts of
Bell and Robinson were essential to holdings in these cases).
339. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text (arguing that dispensing power statute
would not discourage compliance with formalities of execution).
340. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing "ritual" or "cautionary" function
of formalities).
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complying with the requirements for will execution.141 In most dispensing

power cases from foreign jurisdictions, the purported wills were defective
because the testator had made a mistake while attempting to execute the
42
will properly.

The argument that the Virginia legislature should not Iexcuse noncompliance with the formalities of execution because these formalities instill a
cautious, reflective spirit in the testator3 4 is unpersuasive in light of current

Virginia law. The Virginia legislature already has undermined the ritual
function of formalities significantly by recognizing holographs as valid

wills. 344 With the exception of the requirement that the testator must intend
to make a disposition of property in a holograph, 345 the requirements for

the execution of holographs are so minimal346 that they do not set the
making of a holograph apart from casual, everyday activities such as writing

a letter. 47 In fact, many holographs are part of letters or notes left in desk
drawers.3 4 The Virginia legislature would be inconsistent in rejecting a

341. See Beyer, supra note 37, at 421, 427-28 (warning attorneys to avoid using only bare
minimum of formality in will execution and noting potential for malpractice suit concerning will
execution); Chaffin, supra note 33, at 308 (stating that attorney should be certain to satisfy rules
of will execution of every state rather than relying on minimum requirements of state in which
attorney practices); Donaldson, supra note 221, at 17 (arguing that Virginia attorneys would
continue to follow established practices for will execution even if legislature were to eliminate some
required formalities, because formalities simplify probate and increase likelihood that document
will be valid under wills acts of other jurisdictions); Johnson, supra note 12, at 13 (stating that
attorneys would continue to strictly follow formalities despite dispensing power statute in order to
simplify probate); Lindgren, supra note 24, at 570 (stating that lawyers will abide by requirements
of wills act even if errors in execution would not invalidate will). But see Clougherty, supra note
31, at 288-89 (arguing that dispensing power statute may encourage testators and attorneys to be
careless in executing wills).
342. See Fassberg, supra note 5, at 648 n.84 (stating that most testators attempt to execute
valid wills); Miller, supra note 69, at 575-76 (noting that in 14 of first 15 cases decided under
South Australia's dispensing power statute, execution errors appeared to be mistakes by testator).
But see Miller, supra note 127, at 342-43 (discussing South Australia cases in which noncompliance
appeared to be deliberate).
343. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing ritual function of formalities).
344. See Donaldson, supra note 221, at 16 (stating that ceremonial function of formalities
has limited importance in jurisdictions, such as Virginia, that permit holographs); Lindgren, supra
note 24, at 558 (arguing that statute permitting holographs is difficult to reconcile with statute
requiring attestation for other wills because execution of holographs serves no ritual function);
supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that Virginia recognizes holographic wills).
345. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (stating that proponent of any will must
prove testamentary intent).
346. See supra notes 181-85, 208-15 and accompanying text (describing requirements for
holographs in Virginia). Testators must write and sign holographs entirely in their own handwriting,
and two witnesses must identify the testator's handwriting at probate. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.149 (Michie 1950) (setting out requirements for will execution).
347. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 325 (noting that holographs are soiinformal as to create
doubt concerning whether testator intended purported holograph as final will); Mann, supra note
5, at 50 (stating that holograph cases are often ludicrous because courts accept suicide notes,
recipes, and tractor fenders with writing scratched on them as holographs). i
348. See, e.g., In re Kimmel's Estate, 123 A. 405, 406-07 (Pa. 1924) (validating as holographic
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dispensing power rule to strengthen the ritual function of formalities while
permitting holographic wills. 9
D.

Difficulty in Implementing Dispensing Power Statutes

Another objection some scholars have made to the suggestion that
legislatures adopt dispensing power statutes is simply that courts will find
such provisions difficult to implement. 3 0 Because testators are dead before
probate, 351 a court trying to decide whether a technically flawed will is
32
genuine must determine what was intended by a person who is now dead. 1
One of the reasons legislatures have required formal execution is that
formalities, such as the requirement that testators sign wills, provide concrete, internal evidence that the testator executed the will with testamentary
intent.35 3 Any document at issue in a dispensing power case will by definition
lack some of the required formalities 354 and thus will provide the court with
less internal evidence of testamentary intent than would a nondefective
will.

355

Extrinsic evidence of a decedent's intent may be unrellable. 356

will section of letter that also discussed proper way to pickle pork and possibility that testator
might visit relatives); Thomas v. Copenhaver, 365 S.E.2d 760, 764 (Va. 1988) (validating as
holographic will piece of note paper containing various dispositive provisions, testator's signature,
and date that testator left in desk drawer); Mumaw v. Mumaw, 203 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Va. 1974)
(stating that letters may be valid wills if letters clearly express testamentary intent); see also John
O'Grady, Recent Developments Affecting Probate Administration and Taxation, in VtGnmuI
PROBATE: BEYOND rH BAstcs 1, 9 (National Business Inst., Inc. ed, 1989) (discussing Thomas).
349. See supra notes 343-49 and accompanying text (explaining that holographs undercut
ritual function of formalities).
350. See infra notes 351-64 and accompanying text (discussing potential difficulties in implementing dispensing power statutes).
351. See supra notes 289, 300 (explaining normal rule that testators are dead before probate
and discussing possible rare exceptions to this rule).
352. See Mann, supra note 5, at 61 (arguing that one reason judges have been inflexible in
application of wills act formalities is that courts have difficulty determining testator's intent at
probate); William F. Ormiston, Formalities and Wills: A Plea for Caution, 54 AusTL. L.J. 451,
454-55 (1980) (noting that courts applying dispensing power statute must examine intent of testator
and stating that determining intent after testator has died is difficult).
353. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary purpose of formalities).
354. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that courts may apply dispensing power rule
when courts recognize purported will is defective); Miller, supra note 21, at 688 (stating that courts
use dispensing power to excuse noncompliance with statutory formalities); supra notes 148-66 and
accompanying text (discussing dispensing power).
355. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (explaining that formalities provide courts
with internal evidence of testamentary intent).
356. See Ormiston, supra note 352, at 456 (noting that witnesses in probate cases may be
forgetful or interested in outcome of case); Clougherty, supra note 31, at 290 (stating that
proponents' stake in outcome of probate case makes evidence that proponents present unreliable).
Ormiston recommends that courts should be hesitant to admit testimony concerning the testator's
direct expressions of intent because the testator, who is no longer alive to testify at probate, may
not have made such expressions sincerely. Ormiston, supra note 352, at 455.
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The fact that Virginia circuit courts already must consider what was
intended by a decedent35 7 and must rely heavily on extrinsic evidence 351 in
some probate proceedings indicates that the courts would be able to handle
dispensing power cases competently.35 9 Courts focus directly on the testator's

3
intent in deciding whether to admit a purported holographic will to probate 60
and in handling certain other probate matters.3 61 Virginia circuit courts also
hear some probate cases, such as suits to establish lost wills, 362 that require
the courts to consider a great deal of extrinsic evidence.363 Case law from
foreign jurisdictions demonstrates that substantial amounts of extrinsic
evidence have been available for the courts in most dispensing power cases. 364

E.

GrantingDiscretion to Probate Courts and Promoting Uncertainty in

the Law
The strongest objection to the Virginia legislature's passage of a

dispensing power statute is that such a rule would confer too much
discretion on the state circuit courts.3 65 Statutes conferring discretion on
the courts remove substantive decisions from the legislature and place
them in the hands of judges. 366 Although a certain level of judicial
357. See infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text (discussing types of cases in which courts
must examine testator's intent at probate).
358. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text (explaining that Virginia courts admit
extrinsic evidence in some probate proceedings).
359. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 14 (stating that Virginia courts would handle dispensing
power provision with same discernment that courts currently exercise in other instances in which
courts have extensive control over life, liberty, and fortunes of people).
360. See Mann, supra note 5, at 50 (stating that testator's intent is' key issue in probate
proceedings concerning holographic wills).
361. See Chaffin, supra note 33, at 350 (noting that courts examine decedent's intent in
deciding whether to apply doctrine of dependent relative revocation); Mann, supra note 5, at 61
n.126 (noting that courts directly consider testator's intent in cases in which challenger contends
that will was sham or joke).
362. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing use of extrinsic evidence in cases
to establish lost wills).
363. See 1 HARRrsON, supra note 1, § 129 (noting that courts admit much extrinsic evidence
when challengers attack testator's capacity to make will); Hutton, supra note 286, at 50-53
(discussing how to prove fraud in probate cases in Virginia and demonstrating that attorneys use
extrinsic evidence to prove fraud); Ormiston, supra note 352, at 456 (noting that courts use
extrinsic evidence in applying family maintenance statutes).
364. See Miller, supra note 69, at 582 (stating that in most dispensing power cases, courts
have found sufficient amounts of extrinsic evidence to determine intent of testators).
365. See infra notes 366-80 and accompanying text (discussing concern that dispensing power
statute would confer too much discretion on circuit courts).
366. See Glendon, supra note 283, at 1166 (noting that legislatures can transfer responsibility
for decisions to courts by conferring discretion on courts). Glendon notes that discretion is on the
rise in many areas of American law, and she contends that a balance of fixed rules and judicial
discretion is needed to promote both coherence and flexibility in the law. Id. at 1165-66. Not
everyone is comfortable with the idea of conferring discretion on the courts to decide substantive
matters of probate law. See Ormiston, supra note 352, at 453, 457 (stating that legislatures should
not give courts discretion to excuse all formal defects in wills and stating that legislatures should
instead reconsider which required formalities truly are necessary and reform statute).
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7
discretion is needed to prevent rules from becoming too inflexible,36
36
judgments.
in
judicial discretion increases arbitrariness and uncertainty
Very broad delegations of discretion in statutes make meaningful review
of trial court decisions impossible because the statute contains no significant limitations on trial court action.3 69 A lack of appellate review stifles
370
the development of judicial interpretations of the statute.
Virginia circuit courts are competent to exercise discretion in dispensing power cases. 371 Although court clerks normally decide whether to
admit a will to probate,3 72 Virginia law permits a de novo appeal as a
matter of right from a clerk's order. 373 Therefore, interested parties could
374
make certain that a circuit court judge decided a dispensing power case.
Virginia circuit court judges are accustomed to applying judicial discretion
in deciding cases because other areas of Virginia law grant judges broad
375
discretion.
However, adopting a dispensing power provision in Virginia could
make probate law very uncertain for a long time.3 76 Virginia is a strong
common-law state in which cases from the 1800s are frequently the most
recent authority on a point of law. A dispensing power statute would
377
place in doubt all of the common law concerning the execution of wills

367. See Glendon, supra note 283, at 1166-67 (stating that some judicial discretion is necessary
to promote flexibility, creativity, and adaptability in the law).
368. See Fassberg, supra note 5, at 628 (noting that form connotes consistency, universality
of treatment, and protection against arbitrariness); Glendon, supra note 283, at 1166 (noting that
statutes must balance discretion with rules to promote coherence in law). Because of a belief that
probate judges are not competent to exercise broad discretion, states traditionally have been
especially concerned about granting discretion to probate courts. See Lewis M. Simes & Paul E.
Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: II, 43 Ihc. L. REv. 113, 117 (1944)
(noting that probate court judges often are not even lawyers and receive lower salaries than other
judges at trial court level); Simes & Basye, supra note 63, at 988, 992 (noting that states often
have characterized probate courts as inferior and have demonstrated mistrust of probate decisions).
369. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. Rav. 1, 4 (1985) (noting
that broad delegations of discretion fail to provide meaningful standards for review of lower court
decisions); Mann, supra note 5, at 64 (arguing that strict rules governing will execution cases allow
appellate courts to control discretion and decisions of lower courts).
370. See Atiyah, supra note 369, at 5 (stating that fruitful development of common law is
stifled without appellate court control of lower court decisions).
371. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 14 (stating that Virginia courts would be able to exercise
dispensing power with discernment).
372. See ARrHuR Er AL., supra note 254, at 31 (stating that proponents of will normally go
to circuit court clerk for probate); supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text (discussing probate
of wills in Virginia circuit courts).
373. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text (discussing provision in Virginia Code
for de novo appeals from clerks' probate orders).
374. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (stating that any interested party may appeal
to circuit court from clerk's order admitting or refusing to admit will to probate).
375. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 14 (stating that Virginia courts have extensive control
over life, liberty and fortunes of people in many instances).
376. See infra notes 377-80 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that dispensing
power statute could cause uncertainty in Virginia probate law).
377. See Miller, supra note 69, at 580 (noting that dispensing power statute could create
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that the state courts have been developing for over 200 years. 78 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court of Virginia is the only state court with
jurisdiction to hear appeals from probate decisions, 379 the meaningful
review that is so critical to promoting consistent interpretations and
applications of the law s0 would be sorely lacking in dispensing power
law.
Although the potential for a dispensing power statute to create uncertainty in Virginia probate law is troubling,38 1 none of the criticisms
that scholars have leveled at dispensing power provisions outweighs the
policy of effectuating the intent of testators. A dispensing power statute
may cause an initial increase in probate litigation, 3 2 encourage some suits
with difficult proof problems, 8 3 and force the circuit courts to use their
discretion in determining when to excuse formal defects.38 4 However, the
legislature can reduce the degree to which such statutes increase litigation
or promote uncertainty in the law by including in the statute clear
guidelines for the circuit courts to follow.38 For example, the legislature
should state expressly whether the statute covers deliberate execution
errors or only innocent mistakes, whether the statute covers defective
revocations and alterations of wills, and what level of proof courts should
require in dispensing power cases.386 In any case, the Conveyance of a
testator's estate to the intended beneficiaries after some expense and delay
seems preferable to the speedy and inexpensive conveyance of the testa-

uncertainty concerning which documents courts will admit to probate); Miller, supra note 21, at
719 (arguing that dispensing power approach blurs parameters of law of wills and increases
amorphism in law of wills); Clougherty, supra note 31, at 289 (stating that dispensing power
statute would create uncertainty in probate law).
378. See SHEPHERD'S STAT. OF VA. ch. 30 (1792) (setting out requirements for execution and
revocation of wills).
379. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text (explaining that Virginia Court of Appeals
does not have jurisdiction over probate matters).
380. See supra note 370 and accompanying text (noting importance of appellate review in
development of common law).
381. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text (discussing potential of dispensing power
statute to create uncertainty in Virginia probate law).
382. See supra notes 324-38 and accompanying text (discussing potential of dispensing power
statute to increase litigation).
383. See supra notes 350-64 and accompanying text (noting that dispensing power cases would
force probate courts to examine intent of testators and to analyze extrinsic evidence).
384. See supra notes 365-75 and accompanying text (explaining that dispensing power statute
would confer broad discretion on Virginia circuit courts).
385. See Glendon, supra note 283, at 1191 (noting that granting too much discretion to courts
may promote litigation); supra notes 366-69 and accompanying text (noting that lack of guidelines
in statutes promotes uncertainty in law).
386. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 53 (criticizing South Australia dispensing power statute
because it does not explicitly cover defective written revocations); Miller, supra note 69, at 566,
583-86 (noting that dispensing power has many forms and discussing possible variations in harmless
error rules). Miller notes that harmless error statutes vary as to what level of proof proponents
of defective wills must meet and as to whether attempted compliance with the formalities by the
testator is necessary for courts to validate a defective will. Miller, supra note 69, at 583-86.
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tor's estate to people whom the testator did not wish to receive the
estate.137
The legislature also can minimize the risk that a dispensing power
statute would allow dishonest witnesses to establish any scrap of paper
as a legal will. The legislature should require that the proponents of wills
in dispensing power cases prove the wills' genuineness by clear and
convincing evidence. 88 Because dispensing power statutes promote the
intent of testators without violating any equally weighty policy concerns,
the Virginia legislature should adopt a dispensing power statute.

IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional insistence by American courts that testators comply
strictly with every formality of execution in the state wills acts 3 9 leads to
harsh results. Courts following the strict compliance rule refuse to probate
many genuine expressions of testamentary intent due to technical defects,
and frustrate the testators' expressed desires. 319 Many scholars suggest that
courts should excuse harmless errors in the execution of wills or that
legislatures should expressly authorize courts to dispense with the statutory
formalities in order to validate documents clearly intended to be wills. 391
Although some American courts have been willing to validate defective
documents that substantially comply with the wills act formalities, 392 no
state legislature yet has adopted a dispensing power statute. 393 Presently,
dispensing power statutes exist only in foreign jurisdictions. 394
Although the Virginia wills act does not require as many formalities as
the wills acts of certain other states, 395 Virginia case law indicates that many
Virginia testators do make errors in executing wills. 396 The Virginia Supreme
Court historically followed the strict compliance rule and invalidated any

387. See id. at 581 (noting that dispensing power provisions promote intent of testators even
if dispensing power litigation delays administration of some estates); Oerton, supra note 280, at
1418 (suggesting that spending estate's money on dispensing power litigation may be preferable to
giving estate to people whom testator did not intend to share in estate).
388. See U.P.C. § 2-503 cmt. (1990) (stating that legislatures should require clear and
convincing evidence of testator's intent in dispensing power cases to provide procedural safeguard
appropriate to seriousness of issue).
389. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (discussing traditional strict compliance

rule).
390. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (noting that strict compliance rule causes
courts to invalidate genuine but defective wills and frustrates expressed intent of testators).
391. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (noting that scholars have advocated

judicial and legislative harmless error rules concerning execution of wills).
392. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that some courts apply judicial
substantial compliance doctrine).
393. See supra note 24 (noting that no state wills act contains dispensing power provision).
394. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (describing dispensing power statutes
abroad).
395. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (noting that Virginia requires fewer formalities

of execution than do some other states).
396. See supra note 317 (listing Virginia cases concerning defective wills).
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formally defective will. 97 After moving away from the strict compliance
rule in 1950, the Virginia Supreme Court has applied a judicial substantial
compliance doctrine in two cases to excuse minor formal defects in wills.39
Virginia should take the next step in the process of promoting the intent
of testators: Virginia should adopt a dispensing power statute. A dispensing
power statute would provide clearer authorization for the courts to excuse
harmless errors in wills than does the substantial compliance doctrine. 399
Although a dispensing power statute could cause an initial increase in
litigation, create uncertainty in Virginia probate law, and force the state
circuit courts to handle some difficult cases, 4°° these potential problems with
a dispensing power approach do not outweigh the benefit of protecting the
intent of testators. 4° 1 Moreover, the General Assembly can minimize the
potential negative consequences of a dispensing power statute by careful
drafting. If the General Assembly does enact a dispensing power statute,
the General Assembly should delineate clearly the scope of the statute and
required in dispensing power
should state expressly that the level of4 proof
2
cases is clear and convincing evidence. 0
KELLY

A. HARwtN

397. See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text (discussing traditional strict compliance
rule in Virginia).
398. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia, substantial compliance
1
cases).
399. See supra note 314 and accompanying text (noting that dispensing power provisions
provide clearer authorization than substantial compliance doctrine for courts to excuse defects in

wills).
400. See supra notes 323-80 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems that
dispensing power approach could cause).
401. See supra notes 381-88 and accompanying text (concluding that policy of promoting
intent of testators outweighs potential disadvantages of dispensing power approach).
402. See supra notes 386, 388 and accompanying text (recommending that General Assembly
unambiguously define scope of statute and require that proponents of defective wills in dispensing
power cases meet clear and convincing burden of proof).

